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Preface 
Trade and growth take a prominent position on the international agenda. The ongoing 
international trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO provide expectations 
that developing countries may become more integrated in the world economy in order 
to promote growth and prosperity in these countries. Globalisation has evolved rap-
idly among the developed countries where trade has grown considerably, while de-
veloping countries only display more modest progress in trade, which is seen as one 
of the reasons for lack of growth in many developing countries particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
  
This report is the first work product from the project “Endogenous growth, trade and 
development: The road towards eradication of poverty?” financed by Forskningsrådet 
for Udviklingsforskning (RUF). The purpose of the project is to examine (theoreti-
cally and empirically) the connections between openness and growth, and derived ef-
fects on poverty and income structure. Thus, the project aims at examining how de-
velopment aid can be designed in order to further openness, growth and employment 
and ease possible negative effects on poverty. 
 
Lill Andersen and Kim Martin Lind from the International Economics and Policy Di-
vision at FOI have prepared the report. Rie Paving Mortensen has contributed with 
writings on unified growth theory and appropriate technologies. Michael Haase has 
found and provided relevant literature as well as prepared a first draft of the survey. 
The authors have benefited from useful comments and suggestions from Ronald A. 
Babula, Rie Paving Mortensen, and Helene Hartmann.  
 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics, May 2006. 
Søren E. Frandsen  
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Executive summary 
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature that analyses the correlation between openness and economic growth in or-
der to evaluate the state of the art. The review incorporates many types of interna-
tional linkages: international commodity trade, international knowledge spillovers, in-
ternational technology diffusion, imitation, and multinational corporations. However, 
in defining the boundaries of the review, it has been decided to focus on long-run 
growth effects of openness that are not country or case-specific. Hence, we consider 
theoretical models that generate endogenous long-run growth, and empirical studies 
concerned with correlation patterns that apply to many countries. 
 
The survey starts by providing an overview of growth mechanisms stressed in the 
theoretical literature. Traditionally, economists have focussed on physical capital ac-
cumulation as the main source of growth while treating technological progress as ex-
ogenous. During the last 20 years a new wave of research on economic growth has 
cast human capital formation, and research and development of new or better tech-
nologies as the ultimate sources of growth, thereby explaining long-run growth. These 
theories have been criticised for resting on a knife-edge issue, incorporating scale ef-
fects, and contradicting empirical evidence of income convergence across countries. 
The survey shows that all these criticisms may be rejected, leaving economists with 
rich, dynamic frameworks that allow for theoretical analyses of long-run growth ef-
fects of many types of international linkages.  
 
Following this overview, empirical literature on the correlation between international 
trade and growth are summarised. While there is overwhelming empirical evidence of 
positive level effects of international trade and other international linkages, the jury is 
still out on the question of whether there are positive dynamic effects of openness. 
The numerous attempts to establish a robust link have not proven to be entirely con-
vincing, first, because data are scarce and of a low quality especially for many devel-
oping countries, and, second, because openness can affect the growth mechanisms of 
an economy in many ways. Thus, simple measures of openness may not be able to 
capture the full extent of the impacts, and country specifics play a major role. Hence, 
there is a need for targeted and rigorous econometric analyses of the correlation be-
tween openness and growth based on high-quality data and appropriate theoretical 
specifications. 
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The remainder of the paper is devoted to surveying the theoretical literature that in-
vestigates the correlation between openness and long-run growth. Opening up for 
communication and cooperation at an informal level may facilitate the international 
diffusion of general knowledge which unambiguously promotes growth across coun-
tries because it raises productivity in the research sector, and because more labour is 
allocated towards research activity. The dynamic effects of opening up for interna-
tional commodity trade are more uncertain. International trade promotes growth be-
cause it induces a more efficient allocation of resources between manufacturing and 
research. Hence, countries with a comparative advantage in research and development 
(R&D) specialize relatively in research activity while other countries specialize rela-
tively in manufacturing. As a result the growth rate of the world economy increases 
compared to autarky. However, the dynamic gains from trade may be unequally dis-
tributed across countries and in some cases countries may actually lose. The majority 
of the analyses predicts that countries with a relative abundance of human capital, 
countries with a large initial stock of general knowledge, and countries at a more ad-
vanced technological stage experience higher growth as a result of international trade. 
This is because these countries have an initial comparative advantage in producing the 
good with the largest growth potential, and this initial advantage gives rise to a dy-
namic process that extend the advantage over time. Along with the rich countries ex-
tending their comparative advantages, the poor countries may find themselves spe-
cializing in production activities with low growth potentials, thereby experiencing 
lower growth as a result of international trade. 
 
The main potential source of dynamic gains from openness to poor countries seems to 
be international technology diffusion taking the form of either imitation or multina-
tional corporations. Lower costs of production enable producers in developing coun-
tries to capture market shares and quasi-rents by under-pricing the original innovator 
thereby increasing long-run growth in the developing country. However, when it 
comes to international technology diffusion, there is also a danger of poor countries 
not reaping the dynamic gains: If use of technologies developed in rich countries re-
quires the existence of complementary inputs which are not present in developing 
countries, this may refrain them from using the new technology and gain productivity 
growth.  
 
The theoretical analyses of the dynamic effects of international commodity trade and 
international technology diffusion point to a common policy advise regarding devel-
oping countries: in order to reap the benefits from openness it may be necessary to 
develop certain structural characteristics of the economies. This may ensure that poor 
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countries do not specialize in production activities with low growth potentials in the 
long run, and that they are able to reap dynamic gains from technological advances in 
developed countries.  
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1. Introduction 
The link between trade and growth has at least since the publication of Adam Smith’s 
“Wealth of Nations” been under scrutiny by the academic profession. David Ri-
cardo’s theory of comparative advantage has laid the foundation for the belief among 
the vast majority of economists that international trade augments national as well as 
personal income, although some opposition to this view has been mounted by Marxist 
inspired theorists. However, even though the dispute concerning the benefits of inter-
national trade on the level of income has been largely won by the “pro-traders”, the 
issue of whether trade, international diffusion of technology, and other international 
linkages are conducive to growth remains unresolved. It is, however, an important 
question since even small differences in annual growth rates have large consequences 
for standards of living when cumulated over a generation or more. 
 
In the public debate particularly in the context of the multilateral trading regime as 
administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) often the viewpoint and im-
plicit presumption is that trade is a catalyst for growth. For example, the first sentence 
in the ministerial declaration from the DOHA Ministerial Meeting in 2001 reads “The 
multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization has contrib-
uted significantly to economic growth, development and employment throughout the 
past fifty years”.1  Nevertheless, convincing irrefutable evidence for this underlying 
hypothesis cannot be said to have been found. A large amount of anecdotal evidence 
and case study results exist that seem to support the view, although these studies have 
been criticised on both econometric grounds as well as for theoretical deficiencies. 
 
When it comes to trade policy the unresolved question of the link between trade and 
growth implies often conflicting views on the role of trade policy. An example is the 
debate of the import-substitution strategy versus the export-oriented policy. Up until 
the 1980’s a prevailing view on the role of trade policy was founded in the infant in-
dustry argument. Economies in lower stages of development need to protect domestic 
industries from foreign competition until they have reached a sufficient level of com-
petitiveness. Thus, import barriers were generally viewed as a vehicle for growth. The 
experience, however, of the so-called Asian tiger economies have shifted focus from 
the inward-looking to a more outward-looking export oriented view. Consequently, 
more focus is directed towards trade liberalization instead of domestic barriers as a 
vehicle for growth. 
                                                                      
1 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm 
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During the last 20 years the theoretical development has provided economists with 
rich dynamic frameworks that suggest quite a number of different ways in which in-
ternational trade, international knowledge diffusion, imitation, and other types of in-
ternational linkages may affect long-run growth rates. The advent of the new growth 
theories highlights the importance of empirical analyses on the role of openness in or-
der to provide measurements of the relative importance of various strategies and poli-
cies suggested in the theoretical literature.  
 
The aim of this report is to survey the theoretical and empirical literature on openness 
and economic growth. Core issues are: 
- Which mechanisms foster a correlation between openness and growth? How are 
they incorporated into formal models of economic growth, and which main re-
sults are derived from these frameworks? 
- Does the empirical and theoretical literature provide a decisive answer to the 
question in hand: does openness promote growth? If not - what are the conditions 
under which openness (does not) promotes growth? 
- Are there specific conditions/problems to take account of when considering de-
veloping countries? Are the dynamic effects of imitation and foreign direct in-
vestment different from the effects of international trade between developed 
countries? 
 
The scope of the survey is delineated by including only theoretical analyses of open-
ness and growth conducted with the use of rich dynamic set-ups that include imper-
fect markets, externality effects, and endogenously determined long-run growth. Stud-
ies that highlight level effects and temporary growth effects will not be referred to. In 
the empirical part of the survey we try to deduce some correlation patterns on growth 
and trade that apply to many countries. Therefore, focus is on cross-country regres-
sions, precluding country-specific analyses and case studies. 
 
Chapters 2-4 serve as the foundation of chapters 5-7. The report is organised as fol-
lows. In chapter 2 different mechanisms of growth stressed in the theoretical literature 
are presented. Chapter 3 relates the theoretical frameworks’ predictions about conver-
gence of income across countries or regions to empirical evidence. In chapter 4 we 
focus on the development process that may transform a stagnating, low-income econ-
omy to a growing high-income one. Section 5 deals with the empirical evidence re-
garding a correlation between openness and growth. Different measurement methods 
of openness are presented, and results from cross-country regressions are surveyed. In 
chapter 6 we focus on international commodity trade and the concept of comparative 
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advantage in dynamic theoretical frameworks. Next, in chapter 7 other aspects of 
openness are analysed: international diffusion of general knowledge, diffusion of spe-
cific technological knowledge, multinational corporations, imitation, and the notion of 
appropriate technologies. Chapter 8 contains concluding remarks. 
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2. Growth mechanisms 
At least two empirical regularities concerning economic growth are worth mention-
ing:  
- In many countries per-capita output grows over time, and its growth rate does not 
tend to diminish. Kaldor (1961) observed this in one of his “stylized facts”, and 
more recent evidence is provided by Romer (1986) and Scott (1989); 
- The growth rate of output per worker differs substantially across countries in a 
given period of time and across different historical periods in a given country. 
This is another of Kaldor’s “stylized facts”. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) provide more recent evidence of the cross-
country variation. 
 
The objective of growth theory is to explain some of the mechanisms behind the em-
pirical regularities concerning growth. It is an important task in order to ensure con-
tinued welfare of rich countries and to provide development and growth of poor coun-
tries.  
 
This chapter presents different mechanisms of growth stressed in the theoretical lit-
erature, how they are incorporated into formal theoretical models of growth and de-
velopment, and the long-run behaviour of these models. Traditionally, economists 
have looked to capital formation for explanations of increasing standards of living. As 
a consequence, the early theoretical growth literature focuses on capital accumulation 
as the main source of growth while treating technological progress as exogenous in 
economic analyses. Alternatively, technological progress may be treated as an out-
growth of activities in the economic realm – either by viewing knowledge creation as 
a random occurrence or by introducing a formal theory of human capital accumula-
tion. Section 3.1 reviews models of growth through capital accumulation.  
Schumpeter (1942) and Schmookler (1966) argue that expected profitability of inven-
tive activity determines the pace and direction of industrial innovation. When correct, 
the theory of growth should explain the links between (i) industrial innovation and 
growth, and (ii) market conditions and innovation rates. Recent theoretical growth lit-
erature presented in section 3.2 attempts to explain these two links, and casts research 
and development of new or better technologies as the ultimate source of growth. 
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2.1. Factor accumulation 
The first formal growth model is associated with Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) who 
focus on capital accumulation and exogenous technological progress as the mecha-
nisms that drive growth. The model is characterized by a neoclassical production 
function of diminishing returns to single factors and constant returns to all factors ex-
emplified in the following Cobb-Douglas representation:  
 
1( ) , 0 1Y AL Kα α α−= < <(1)   
 
Y is output that is produced with the use of labour, L, and capital, K. A represents the 
state of technology and α  is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution 
between the two inputs of production. 
 
An increase in one of the productive factors creates output growth in the short run 
through increased productivity of the other factor. However, for a given state of tech-
nology (A constant over time), diminishing returns limits the size of the productivity 
gain as the factor quantity increases. According to the neoclassical theory, this implies 
that the marginal productivity of investments decreases until investments only raise 
physical capital as much as it depreciates. Therefore, for a given labour force, long-
run output growth is feasible only when it is assumed that technological progress 
raises A such that the marginal productivity of capital is constant in the long run, and 
the rate of capital accumulation equals the rate of technological progress.2  Even a 
growing labour force requires technological progress to ensure long-run growth in 
output per worker. 
 
Following the theoretical work by Solow and others, some empirical economists and 
econometricians have analysed the forces behind economic growth. They used the 
methodology of growth accounting where the objective is to break down the growth 
rate of aggregate output into contributions from the growth of inputs.3  Many studies 
find that for developed countries the contribution from technological progress ac-
counts for at least half of overall growth. Solow (1957) found that technological pro-
gress accounts for as much as 85-90 per cent of GDP growth. Hence, technological 
                                                                      
2 In equation (1) it is assumed that technological progress is labour augmenting (Harrod neutral). Al-
ternatively, technological progress may relate to the total factor productivity (Hicks neutral) or to 
capital (Solow neutral). However, only labour augmenting technological progress is consistent 
with the existence of a steady state. 
3 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) chap. 10.4 for a more detailed survey of the methodology and 
results. 
 
16 The Correlation between Openness and Long-Run Economic Growth, FOI 
progress - not explained in the model - accounts for most of the observed growth. 
However, the presumption that technological progress accounts for most of the ob-
served growth does not imply that investment in capital is relatively unimportant in 
determining a country’s growth rate. Kaldor (1961) and Solow (1957) mention that it 
is through investments that technological progress is integrated into the production 
process.4  However, this functional relationship between technological progress and 
investments raises new problems to a model of exogenous technological progress. 
 
The first successful attempt to explain technological progress was made by Arrow 
(1962) who linked the state of technology to cumulative investment experience, A(K). 
By assuming that the effect of capital on productivity is external to an individual in-
vestor, Arrow preserved the perfect competition paradigm but obtained long-run 
growth in the absence of exogenous technological progress as long as the state of 
technology is sufficiently responsive to capital. 
 
The idea of non-diminishing returns to the accumulable factor(s) from a social point 
of view was further exploited by Frenkel (1962), Romer (1986) and Rebelo (1991) 
who developed the so-called AK-model. According to this set-up, the economy is 
characterised by diminishing returns to capital for the individual firm but constant re-
turns to capital from a social point of view. Hence, the production function of an indi-
vidual firm may be given by equation (2): 
 
1y Al kα α−=(2) , 
 
Awhere y is output, l is labour and k is capital of the firm.  represents an external ef-
fect that Frenkel specifies as a function of the overall capital/labour ratio of the econ-
omy: 
 
(3) KA A
L
α⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
                                                                     
,   
where A is a fixed productivity parameter, K is the aggregate stock of capital and L is 
the total amount of labour in the economy.  Although the external effect is endoge-
 
4 Likewise, Aghion and Howitt (1998) develop a model where technological progress is determined 
by endogenous innovations. They show that even though a growth accounting exercise performed 
on an economy described by this model would attribute a very small fraction of growth to techno-
logical progress, the economy would ultimately stop growing altogether if innovation were shut 
down. 
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nous to the economy, it is assumed to be given for each firm, because a firm internal-
izes only a negligible amount of the effect that its own investment decision has on the 
aggregate stock of capital. Since there is non-increasing returns to scale for individual 
firms, the model is consistent with perfect competition but due to the external effect 
of investments, the model generates perpetual growth in the absence of exogenous 
technical progress. 
 
The long-run rate of growth depends on parameters of preferences and technology 
such that policy changes can have long-run growth effects. If Frenkel had taken the 
externality effect to be a function of the total (rather than the average) stock of accu-
mulated capital (Ā=AKα ) then the growth rate would be positively correlated with 
the scale of the economy: the larger the population, the faster the economy grows. 
 
This genre of models typically reinterprets the concept of capital as a broad measure 
of knowledge consisting of both physical and human capital.5  Other external effects 
that prevent the marginal product of knowledge from declining in the literature in-
clude government activity (e.g., Barro (1990) and Futagami et. al. (1993). Aschauer 
(1989) provides empirical evidence). In general, the existence of external effects cre-
ates a divergence between the social valuation of knowledge and the private valuation 
which implies that the growth rate in a decentralized economy falls short of the opti-
mal rate. This leaves room for active government policy that increases the private rate 
of return on investment without introducing new distortions to the economy. 
 
Human capital 
Human capital was originally defined by Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) as knowl-
edge, skills, education, health, and training of individuals. It is treated as capital be-
cause it is an integral part of people that is long-lasting in the way a machine, plant or 
factory lasts. Hence, expenditures on education, training, medical care, and so on are 
investments in human capital. Growth theories focus on two distinct roles of human 
capital. One theory focuses on the accumulation of human capital, while the other 
sees human capital as a facilitator of technological development. According to the 
first theory, the growth of human capital influences GDP growth (Lucas (1988) and 
others), while it is the stock of human capital that influences GDP growth according 
to the second theory (Romer (1990) and others – to be reviewed in section 2.2). 
 
                                                                      
5 The treatment of capital as a composite good may be justified by assuming either that the two 
types of capital are perfect substitutes or that production shows roughly constant returns to scale in 
the two types of capital taken together (Rebelo (1991)). 
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While the growth theorists of the 1950’s focus on physical capital as the accumulable 
factor of the economy, Lucas (1988) treats human capital and physical capital as two 
distinct productive inputs that are produced according to different technologies. 
Hence, he specifies an education sector where human capital is produced according to 
a linear technology: 
 
(4)  h    
  
(1 )u hδ= −&
&
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )h i i u i h iδ=&
( )h i&
                                                                     
h is human capital (or skill level) per worker, u is employment in production, total 
time is fixed and normalised to 1, δ >0 is a productivity parameter and h  the deriva-
tive of h with respect to time. Goods production uses physical capital and human 
capital as inputs according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology.6  Hence, the 
economy is characterised by two accumulable factors of production instead of a single 
accumulable (physical capital) and one non-accumulable (labour) as is the case in the 
neoclassical model. Accordingly, the model implies no diminishing marginal produc-
tivity of investments, and thereby assures endogenous perpetual growth with the 
growth rate determined by parameters of preferences and technology. 
 
This model treats the decision to accumulate human capital as equivalent to a decision 
of going to school. Lucas sets out an alternative model in which all human capital ac-
cumulation is learning-by-doing. He assumes that there are two consumer goods but 
no physical capital accumulation. Each good is consequently produced with the use of 
human capital specialized to the production of that good according to a constant-
returns-to-scale technology. The effect of learning-by-doing is captured by assuming 
that the growth of human capital specialized to the production of good i increases 
with the effort devoted to producing that good: 
 
(5) , 
   
where h(i) is human capital specialized to the production of good i, u(i) is the fraction 
of the workforce devoted to producing good i, δ(i) > 0 is a productivity parameter and 
 is the derivative of h with respect to time. As in the previous model of human 
capital accumulation, the constant returns to human capital ensure a positive long-run 
growth rate in the absence of exogenous technological progress. 
 
6 Lucas assumes an external effect of human capital in the goods production. This effect is intended 
to capture the influence people have on the productivity of others. In order to facilitate the exposi-
tion this effect is excluded here. Also, the validity of this assumption is questionable in the light of 
an empirical study by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  
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2.2. Product development 
Hall & Jones (1999) show great productivity differences among developed countries, 
which is supported by Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare’s (1997) result that over 60% of 
differences in 1985 per capita income cannot be explained by differences in quantities 
of physical or human capital. Hence, these analyses suggest that factor accumulation 
is not the primary source of growth. In line with these empirical findings, one theory 
of economic growth focuses on research and development of new or better products 
as the ultimate source of growth. According to this theory, profit-seeking firms con-
sciously engage in research and development, which in turn fosters technological pro-
gress. Grossman and Helpman (1991) provide empirical evidence of growing spend-
ing by OECD members on commercial research in real terms. Moreover, they find a 
steadily increasing relative importance of commercial research compared to other 
economic activities for the same selection of countries. Hence, industrial R&D now 
receives a substantial allocation of resources in most industrial countries. 
 
Paul Romer was the first to incorporate intentional R&D by profit-seeking firms into 
a formal model (Romer (1990)). He combined valuable diversity and productivity 
gains in R&D, which fosters sustained long-run growth. Romer’s framework is de-
tailed below. 
 
The value of diversity arises from its enhancement of manufacturing productivity for 
a given volume of inputs or from its enhancement of household utility for a given 
volume of consumption.7  Romer assumes that it raises the productivity of manufac-
turing and describes the supply side of the economy as consisting of three sectors: a 
final goods sector that manufactures a homogenous consumer good; an intermediate 
goods sector that manufactures intermediate goods to be used in manufacturing; and a 
research sector that generates designs for new intermediate goods.8 9     
 
Manufacturing takes place according to the following extended Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology: 
 
                                                                      
7 Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) developed a specification of an index that imposes a constant and equal 
elasticity of substitution between every pair of goods. Romer (1990) used the specification to de-
velop an extension of the Cobb-Douglas production function, while Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) used it as an index of consumption. 
8 Romer originally interpreted the output from the intermediate sector as capital goods (durables). 
The choice of interpretation does not change the main conclusions from the model. 
9 Alternatively, one may assume that research on a new design and the production of the new inter-
mediate good take place within the same firm (as in, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991)). 
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(6) ,Y H 1
0
( ) , 0 , 1
A
Y L x i
α β α β α β− −= < <∫
, 0 1A H Aψ ψ
 
 
where Y is output, HY is human capital devoted to manufacturing, L is labour and x(i) 
is the amount of intermediate good-i used in manufacturing. The total stocks of hu-
man capital and labour in the economy are taken as given. A is the number of differ-
entiated intermediate goods that is currently being produced. Hence, intermediate 
goods are imperfect substitutes in manufacturing, and there is monopolistic competi-
tion in the market for intermediate goods. A license law prevents any firm from pro-
ducing an intermediate good without the consent of the patent holder of a design, 
which in turn ensures that successfully innovating firms are compensated with mo-
nopoly rents. In this sense the outcomes of R&D are excludable. But since each re-
search project is assumed to contribute to a stock of general knowledge representing a 
collection of ideas and methods that will be useful to later generations of innovators, 
the outcome of R&D is in this sense non-rival. It is assumed that the stock of general 
knowledge can be measured by the number of existing designs. In this case, an addi-
tional design raises the productivity of all future researchers. Research firms use the 
stock of general knowledge and human capital to produce new designs implying the 
following production technology of the research sector: 
 
(7) A= Γ ≤ ≤&    
   
Where A is the stock of general knowledge measured by the number of existing de-
signs, A&
Γ
                             
is the derivation of A with respect to time, HA is human capital devoted to 
research, is a productivity parameter, and ψ is a parameter that describes the degree 
of knowledge spillovers. The size of the parameter ψ is crucial to the long-term be-
haviour of the model. In order to ensure perpetual per-capita growth it is necessary to 
assume that the output of designs is linear in A, that is ψ=1. For values of ψ less than 
1, per-capita growth may persist for a longer or shorter period of time but will eventu-
ally cease in the absence of any growth-promoting shocks to the economy. Romer as-
sumes ψ=1 based on his observation of a lack of substantial recent evidence that re-
search opportunities are diminishing.10  The assumption should be understood as an 
approximation of a wider case – chosen for expository purposes. 
 
Linearity in A implies that the long-run rate of growth is positively related to the 
amount of human capital devoted to research and negatively related to the interest 
rate. Hence, any policy change that affects either the amount of human capital de-
                                         
10 Romer (1990), page S84. 
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voted to research or the interest rate has long-term growth effects. However, in an 
empirical study Jones (1995) points out that while OECD countries have seen perma-
nent policy changes (trade liberalization, an increase in the average years of school-
ing, increases in investment and in R&D levels), there has been no visible tendency 
for growth in output per person or productivity to increase. The finding of permanent 
policy changes combined with constant long-run growth induced Jones to develop a 
model of so-called semi-endogenous growth by assuming diminishing marginal re-
turns to knowledge with a value of ψ strictly less than one. Now, the long-run rate of 
growth of income per capita is zero in the absence of any growth promoting shocks to 
the economy, and a positive rate of population growth is the only source of long-run 
GDP growth. Young (1998), Segerstrom (1998) and others have built alternative 
semi-endogenous growth models. 
 
In Romer’s framework, long-run equilibrium is inefficient due to monopolistic com-
petition and knowledge spillovers. An additional design raises the productivity of all 
future researchers but because this benefit is non-excludable it is not valued by the 
market. For this reason, too little resources are devoted to research and the growth 
rate is too low compared to social optimum. Moreover, due to monopolistic competi-
tion intermediate goods are sold at a price that exceeds marginal costs. This induces 
manufacturing firms to choose techniques that are below society’s optimal level in in-
termediate goods and above in labour. Since the manufacturing sector competes with 
the research sector for labour, this distortion also tends to produce a suboptimal low 
allocation of resources to the research sector. 
 
The result of too little R&D in a decentralized economy is not a robust feature of this 
class of models. Young (1991) develops a variant of the above-mentioned model, 
which incorporates the notion of learning-by-doing. In this framework, the learning-
by-doing renders enhanced efficiency of existing intermediate goods as they are more 
intensively used in production. This externality implies that overly optimal levels of 
resources are devoted to research activity at the cost of learning-by-doing in the pro-
duction sector. Alvarez-Palaez and Groth (2005) show that too much R&D may occur 
when the following three parameters are disentangled: the parameter determining the 
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, the returns to specialization pa-
rameter and the parameter of elasticity of substitution of output with respect to the in-
dex of intermediate goods. By disentangling these parameters, a third market failure 
appears, namely an effect of increased specialization on the productivity of existing 
intermediate goods in final goods production. This effect may offset the effects of 
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monopolistic competition and knowledge spillovers and generate too much R&D in 
decentralized equilibrium. 
 
Another class of models also challenges the robustness of the inefficiency result. 
While models of product differentiation assume away any obsolescence of old inter-
mediate goods, models of increasing product quality (vertical innovation) build on 
Schumpeter’s (1934) notion of creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt (1992), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991)). With these models, innovation improves the quality 
of a fixed set of intermediate goods or a fixed set of consumer goods, and new gen-
erations of goods displace old generations from the market. Researchers target their 
efforts at particular goods that they see on the market, and attempt to develop superior 
versions of these goods. In this set-up research is not deterministic as in models of 
expanding product variety but entails uncertain prospects. Hence, provided that a firm 
invests a given amount of resources in R&D activity, the arrival of innovations is de-
scribed by a Poisson process. Despite these differences, the same economic mecha-
nism sustains long-run growth in models of rising product quality as in models of ex-
panding product variety.11  However, the models diverge when it comes to welfare. In 
models of rising product quality, the presence of an additional externality tends to 
generate excessive research in decentralized equilibrium. This negative spillover takes 
the form of a “business-stealing effect”, whereby a successful innovator destroys the 
surplus attributable to the previous generation of intermediate good by making it ob-
solete. The private research firm does not internalize this loss but a social planner 
does. This effect will tend to generate a more-than-optimal level of research in a de-
centralised economy. It can be shown that when there is a high degree of monopoly 
power and innovations are modest, the business-stealing effect dominates and decen-
tralised growth is excessive (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1998), chapter 2). 
 
Romer’s model of expanding product variety has been used widely in the literature 
and modified in many ways. These models may include various forms of factor ac-
cumulation but in the absence of innovations, the accumulation process eventually 
ceases. To mention a few modifications that will be referred to in later chapters: 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) assume that the manufacturing of intermediate goods 
uses two types of labour but no intermediate goods, and Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991) assume that the research technology is identical to the manufacturing technol-
ogy such that it uses intermediate goods and labour as well as human capital. 
 
                                                                      
11 Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 4 compares the two models and explain why the alterna-
tive models share the same reduced form. 
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3. Convergence 
The development of endogenous growth theory of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s 
initiated a renewed debate on economic growth. Much of this debate was concerned 
with the empirical implications of the various frameworks and the relation between 
theory and data. Empirical studies of growth have yielded little consensus concerning 
the appropriate models and set of variables to include. For example, Durlauf, Johnson 
and Temple (2004) have found 145 different growth determinants used in the litera-
ture. Nevertheless, some results regarding the question of convergence of income 
across countries have been corroborated by repeated studies. 
 
There exist three main definitions of convergence: Absolute, conditional and club 
convergence. Absolute convergence is when per capita incomes in all areas converges 
to the same long-run growth path, so that all areas tend to converge to the same level 
of income per capita. Conditional convergence occurs when an area’s per capita in-
come converges to a country-specific long-run growth path given by the area’s basic 
structural characteristics. Club convergence happens when countries that are structur-
ally alike and have similar initial conditions converge to the same level of per capita 
income. Figure 1 illustrates the hypotheses of club convergence. The hypotheses im-
ply different relations between the initial per capita income levels and subsequent 
growth rates in income per capita across areas. According to the hypothesis of abso-
lute convergence, areas with relatively low levels of per capita income in an initial 
year will grow relatively faster after that initial year. The hypotheses of conditional 
convergence and club convergence imply the same relationship but convergence is 
conditioned on the areas being structurally alike (and in the case of club convergence 
similar initial conditions). 
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Figure. 1.  Club convergence  
 
 
 
 
Source: Jacobsen and Sørensen (2005), fig. 2.7, page 48 
The diagram shows the log of per capita income on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis. The dotted 
line show the threshold value where countries above this level converges to the high growth club and countries 
below the threshold value converges to the low income club. 
 
Empirical evidence of conditional convergence 
There exists a wide empirical literature that tests the influence of initial income per 
capita on subsequent growth rates. Several studies employing different sets of coun-
tries and regions have found evidence of conditional convergence with a speed of 
convergence at around 2% per year. These studies have included OECD countries, US 
states, counties in Sweden, Japanese prefectures, European countries, Canadian prov-
inces and Australian states (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991); Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992); Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); Cashin (1995); Cashin and Sahay (1996); 
Persson (1997); Shioji (2001)). Thus, a general trend for countries to move towards 
similar per capita income levels when accounting for appropriate differences appears 
to be substantiated from the literature. 
 
The empirical evidence of conditional convergence has served as a criterion for judg-
ing the relevance of the neoclassical growth model versus endogenous growth mod-
 
26 The Correlation between Openness and Long-Run Economic Growth, FOI 
els. The reason is the following: given diminishing returns to capital (as in the neo-
classical model), lower initial values of per capita income generate higher investment 
returns and consequently faster transitional growth, once the determinants of the long-
run equilibrium are controlled for - that is conditional convergence. The assumption 
of constant returns to capital implies that the returns to investment are independent of 
the level of capital, such that there is usually no negative relationship between initial 
income levels and subsequent growth rates. Hence, one does not usually expect condi-
tional convergence in models of closed economies consistent with endogenous 
growth. This coincidence with the stylized fact of conditional convergence is an of-
ten-used argument for exogenous growth models.12   
 
However, even though the Solow model is consistent with conditional convergence, 
the model’s text book version suggests a speed of convergence that far exceeds the 
empirically observed speed of around 2% per year (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
and Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005)). The Solow model with a capital share of 
1/3 and a labour share of 2/3 predicts a rate of convergence to steady state of 5.6 per 
cent per year (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)).13  Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) 
resolve the problem by setting up an augmented Solow model that includes human 
capital: 
 
1( ) , 0 , 1Y AL K Hα β α β α β− −= < <(8)  
   
They show that the model provides a good description of cross-country data. More-
over, setting α = β =1/3 the model can account for a very low speed of convergence 
in accordance with empirical evidence.  
 
However, it is not possible to reject endogenous growth theory based on the conver-
gence result. Ventura (1997) questions whether it is altogether appropriate to use the 
empirical evidence of conditional convergence to discriminate between the various 
growth theories. Ventura focuses on one of the problems: that growth theories are 
typically not designed to resolve why some countries grow faster than others, but 
rather focus on the alternative question of why a country’s growth rate varies over 
time. To conduct comparisons of growth rates across countries in a given period and 
comparisons of growth rates over time in a given country, one has to make some rele-
                                                                      
12 This argument is often taken despite the results of House (2000) and Ventura (1997) that show 
that diminishing returns are not necessarily associated with conditional convergence. 
13 These shares seem reasonable in the light of the empirical works by, e.g., Denison (1962) and 
Maddison (1987). 
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vant assumptions: e.g., international linkages are either nonexistent or unimportant. 
These considerations show that once we allow for open economy settings, the issue of 
convergence cannot be used as a criterion for choosing between models of exogenous 
and endogenous growth.  
 
Two analyses below illustrate the possibility of building endogenous growth models 
that harmonise with conditional convergence by focusing on open economy issues. 
Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) suggest that conditional convergence occurs as a result 
of commodity trade and specialization. In their set-up, there exists a continuum of in-
termediate products that are produced according to an AK-technology and final goods 
that are produced with the use of domestic physical capital and the range of interme-
diates. In this case, international trade in intermediate products implies that countries 
with an above-average rate of capital accumulation experience declining export prices 
because the greater supply reduces the relative prices of the intermediates produced in 
that country. This mimics diminishing returns in the neoclassical model by dampen-
ing the rate of return to capital, and discourages further accumulation. Ben-David & 
Loewy (2000) analyse a version of Lucas’ primary model of human capital accumula-
tion in an open economy setting. They include international spillovers in the accumu-
lation of human capital. The extent of these spillovers depend on (i) accessibility to 
other countries’ knowledge (which is facilitated by trade), and (ii) ability to absorb 
and utilize the accessible knowledge stocks abroad (social capability). Contrary to the 
closed economy-version of the model, this open economy-version preserves the con-
ditional convergence feature, but extends the conditions for convergence: Countries 
have to implement the same trade policies in order to converge to the same growth 
path.14  
 
Empirical evidence of club convergence 
The hypothesis of conditional convergence is further corroborated by another re-
peated finding in several studies, namely the existence of convergence clubs or multi-
ple regimes. Hence, the world’s countries do not converge toward a common level 
unconditionally. Instead, differences in initial conditions and endowments cause 
economies to move in separate directions where the endpoints are determined by dif-
ferent equilibrium conditions. An indication of the existence of different long-term 
equilibria can be seen in figure 2. 
 
 
                                                                      
14 Also, technology transfer may imply conditional convergence in models consistent with endoge-
nous growth – see chapter 7 for details. 
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Figure 2   
 
 
Source: Durlauf et. Al. (2004), fig. 1 
The diagram shows the “frequency” on the vertical axis and countries’ income in terms of GDP per worker on 
the horizontal axis. The dotted line displays the distribution in the year 2000 and the solid ling the distribution in 
1960. 
 
The figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of GDP per worker across 
the countries of the world relative to the 1960 value for the USA. The distribution for 
the year 2000 values displays two modes, which would be indicative of growth proc-
esses with more than one long-run equilibrium. In fact, a number of studies involving 
a variety of different techniques have provided evidence of the existence of multiple 
regimes. 
 
Durlauf and Johnson (1995) find using classification methods nonlinearities in the 
growth process, which is implied by the existence of convergence clubs. They test a 
null-hypothesis of a single common growth regime against a process of multiple re-
gimes. The common growth process is rejected in favour of convergence clubs. This 
result is interpreted as being generated by initial conditions. 
 
Papageorgiou and Masanjala (2004) re-examine Durlauf and Johnson’s results and 
find similar evidence for multiple growth regimes. Their method identifies thresholds 
in the data, which produce four separate growth regimes. Tan (2004) using general-
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ised, unbiased interaction detection and estimation finds statistically significant evi-
dence for the existence of convergence clubs. In this case, the clubs are determined by 
differences in institutional quality and ethnic fractionalisation. 
 
Factoring methods and clustering procedures have also been applied in the search for 
growth regimes. Desdoigt (1999) found four clusters with distinct growth processes: 
the OECD countries, Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. In the case of the 
OECD cluster, the identifying variables are human capital (primary and secondary 
schooling), initial income differences and the growth of the labour force. The remain-
ing three clusters emphasize the importance of government consumption, human capi-
tal and investments in capital goods. These findings are interpreted as accentuating 
the importance of structural characteristics rather than initial conditions. Kourtellos 
(2003) likewise applies factoring methods and clustering procedures and finds support 
for two equilibria discriminated by differences in initial conditions. 
 
Panel data analysis is used by Canova (2004) to identify the existence of several re-
gimes among regions of Europe. Again the ordering variable for the different conver-
gence clubs is initial income. 
 
In conclusion, a substantial body of literature exists that supports the notions of dif-
ferent equilibria, convergence clubs and multiple regimes. The number of different 
regimes found in the literature varies significantly. Moreover, the causes for the 
emergence of clubs are disputed with some emphasising the role of initial conditions 
whereas others advocate the differences in structural characteristics. Nevertheless, the 
notion dating back from at least Solow of a single universal growth regime applicable 
to all countries and regions does not seem to be in accordance with the empirical evi-
dence. The search is on for identifying the discriminating features that force econo-
mies into specific growth paths. 
 
A successful model incorporating the salient features of growth and the stylised facts 
deduced from the available empirical data requires incorporating the substantiated 
evidence of multiple regimes and convergence within the regimes. Thus, on the posi-
tive side each economy in the world does not follow its own entirely individual 
growth path although the empirical evidence points to a number of different steady-
states. An all-encompassing model therefore needs to be able to divide countries into 
the appropriate groups. Furthermore, the question of the distinguishing features 
whether it may be structural characteristics or initial conditions should be addressed. 
From a policy oriented point of view finding the dividing factors to be structural char-
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acteristics would leave room for policy action and government intervention in order to 
move an economy from a low growth regime to a higher one. Changing initial condi-
tions, on the other hand, is beyond the scope of government policy. 
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4. The development process 
The observation that an all-encompassing model needs to be able to divide countries 
into appropriate groups and that the development of a country may be divided into 
distinct epochs has led some researchers to describe the development process as a se-
ries of stages where each stage is characterised by a set of measures related to the de-
velopmental level of the economy. Such measures traditionally include GDP per cap-
ita, the investment rate, the capital-output ratio and several others. The original stage 
theory was formulated by Rostow (1952, 1960) who distinguished five stages of de-
velopment. More recently, researchers have built formal models where various 
growth mechanisms vary in importance at different stages of development. The transi-
tion from one stage to another is either caused by an exogenous shock to the economy 
or explained endogenously. These theories are surveyed in chapter 4.1. 
 
The stage theories fail to incorporate the consequences of a country’s economic de-
velopment for the fertility of the population and visa versa. Thereby, these theories do 
not explain the intricate development of the population size along with the develop-
ment of income per capita and technology. However, the evolution of the size of the 
population is an important determinant of income per capita as is technological pro-
gress – through most of human history, technological progress has fostered population 
growth thereby failing to expand income per capita. For this reason, the so-called uni-
fied growth theory incorporates a fertility choice by households. It aims at capturing 
the growth process throughout human history in a single framework where economies 
take-off from one epoch to another through a gradual process. This theory and other 
theories that aim at explaining both long-run growth and fertility are surveyed in 
chapter 4.2. 
4.1. Stage theories 
Kuznets (1971) c.f. Meier (1995) defined stage-theory as “... a theory of long-term 
economic change implying: (1) distinct time segments, characterized by different 
sources and patterns of economic changes; (2) a specific succession of these seg-
ments, so that b cannot occur before a, or c before b; and (3) a common matrix, in that 
the successive segments are stages in one broad process – usually one of development 
and growth rather than of devolution and shrinkage. Stage theory is most closely as-
sociated with a uni-directional rather than cyclic view of history. In the cyclic view 
the stages are recurrent; in a uni-directional view, a stage materializes, runs its course, 
and never recurs. Even in the process of devolution and decline, the return to a level 
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experienced previously is not viewed as a recurrence of the earlier stage.” Thus, 
Kuznets’ definition implies a distinct causality and specific delimited stages. Models 
with different equilibria are not necessarily stage-theories in the Kuznets sense, be-
cause the equilibrium outcomes may be independent of one another. 
 
The original stage-theory was formulated by Rostow (1952; 1960). He distinguished 
five stages: the traditional society, the establishment of the preconditions for take-off, 
the take-off into self-sustained growth, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass 
consumption. The first stage is characterised as a traditional, stagnant, predominantly 
agricultural society with a low capital accumulation rate. In the second phase, where 
the preconditions for take-off is established, some leading entrepreneurs emerge typi-
cally as a result of external stimuli, which increase the rate of investment to net na-
tional income up to 5%. The take-off occurs when the investment rate increases from 
less than 5% to more than 10%; one or more substantial manufacturing sectors with a 
high growth rate emerge; and societal, judicial, political and institutional changes that 
are conducive to growth emerge. The last two stages can be described as convergence 
to a high-income level, where the economy finally reaches a steady-state equilibrium. 
 
Rostow’s stage-theory has received quite a lot of criticism. In particular, Rostow fails 
to provide an adequate description of the process of inter-stage transition. Further-
more, empirical analyses show that some of Rostow’s aggregate measures such as the 
investment rate that are crucial to characterise different stages fail to explain different 
observed development paths of nations such as Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
the USA. 
 
More recent stage theories explain the transition from one stage to another either by 
exogenous shocks to the economy or as endogenous shifts. Baldwin et al (2001) pre-
sent a model with two regions (North and South). The authors assume that (i) devel-
opment emerges from decreasing transaction costs of trading goods and dispersing 
ideas, and (ii) transition from one stage to another arises from exogenous shocks to 
transaction costs. The model entails only one accumulating factor, local knowledge 
capital, implying that knowledge is not dispersed globally. Initial conditions and fac-
tor endowments are assumed identical in two regions. In the first stage, trade in goods 
is low due to high transportation costs. An exogenous decrease in transportation costs 
renders trade a profitable venture. This induces industry to cluster in the Northern re-
gion and decline in the South with the North experiencing a take-off. During the next 
stage of development, the North reaches an equilibrium where per-capita income lev-
els are higher than in the South. In the third stage, the costs of diffusion of knowledge 
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decreases. The South consequently takes advantage of the knowledge accumulated in 
the North and converges to the high-income level. Thus, the rate of technology diffu-
sion is determined by the costs of exchanging information. The implication is, there-
fore, that the substantial decreases in the costs of exchanging information that has oc-
curred in the last two or three decades would induce convergence of all developing 
countries to the high-income level (that is absolute convergence). 
 
Next, models that incorporate different growth mechanisms in different stages of de-
velopment are presented. Funke and Strulik’s (2000) model encompasses physical 
capital accumulation, human capital accumulation and product development. Only 
physical capital is accumulated in the first stage and both physical and human capital 
accumulate through improvements in the quality of labour in the second stage. Inno-
vation drives growth in the third and final stage. The transition to a higher stage of 
development is explained endogenously since the development process itself changes 
the investment habits of individuals. During the first stage of development physical 
capital accumulation ensures that the wage rate per unit of human capital grows 
which at some point in time induces households to invest permanently in human capi-
tal formation. At this point in time the economy enters the second stage of develop-
ment, when the amount of human capital increases implying a drop in the wage rate 
per unit of human capital.15  Since R&D is conducted only with human capital, this 
development implies an ultimate equality between the value of an innovation and its 
costs. At this point, the economy propels to the final development stage. The authors 
demonstrate that the growth rate during this stage surpasses the growth rate of the 
second stage. The model predicts that depending on initial endowments and the pro-
ductivity of knowledge formation, some countries may converge towards a state of 
stagnation and underdevelopment where neither human capital accumulation nor in-
novations occur.  
 
Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2002) also focus on the role of human capital in a stage-
like model of vertical innovation. The authors assume that modern R&D involves 
highly advanced scientific skills. Three different stages are produced by the model: A 
stagnation stage where new technologies cannot be applied; an implementation stage 
where no R&D is carried out domestically, but new technologies developed by R&D-
conducting countries are absorbed; and a high-income stage where new technologies 
are developed. The level of human capital determines a country’s capability for ap-
                                                                      
15 Note that when the wage rate per unit of human capital decreases this does not mean that the wage 
rate per hour decreases. The implication is rather that the wage differential between workers with 
a high education and workers with a low education decreases. 
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plying and developing new technologies. This is not a stage model, in that it does not 
predict a uni-directional path from one stage to another. Instead it produces three dif-
ferent equilibria. The initial factor endowments are the prime determinants for which 
of the three equilibria characterises a specific country. Deliberate costly government 
actions are required in order to move from one stage to a higher stage. 
 
More deterministic explanations for income differences across countries are presented 
in Kejak (2003) where underdevelopment traps in a model of physical and human 
capital accumulation occurs when the initial factor endowments are too low. The 
speed of human capital accumulation is too slow compared to the level of physical 
capital; hence the country is trapped in underdevelopment.  
 
Acemoglu et al (2006) construct a model where governmental policies play an impor-
tant role for development. Initially, an economy pursues an investment-based strategy 
relying on existing firms in order to maximise investment given market imperfections 
and governments’ focus on investments, firms are protected and benefit from the im-
perfect markets. Monopolistic rents accruing to the existing firms create a shield ef-
fect by buying political power. This implies that the economy could pursue the in-
vestment-based strategy for too long and never switch to an innovation-based strategy 
where new technologies are created through R&D. Thus, although the investment-
based strategy produces higher growth for low-income economies, pursuing this strat-
egy for too long can lead to an underdevelopment trap. The model underlines the im-
portance of good and timely governmental policies but also provides an explanation 
for why socially undesirable policies may be pursued for too long leading to non-
optimal economy-wide outcomes. 
 
Explanations for the income grouping patterns of countries vary with the chosen stage 
theory: Baldwin et al. focus on the costs of exchanging goods and information, and 
others view the relative speed of human capital accumulation compared to physical 
capital accumulation as important determinants (Funke and Strulik, and Kejak). 
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes point out the significance of initial conditions in particular 
the level of human capital. But the ability for government policy to incite economic 
development and escape underdevelopment traps is common to all surveyed theories.  
4.2. Endogenous fertility 
In Romer’s model of growth through product development, the long-run rate of 
growth is positively correlated with population (provided that a larger population im-
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plies that a larger amount of human capital is devoted to research). In this sense, the 
growth rate is positively correlated with the scale of the economy. Jones and others 
contend that there is no empirical evidence of such a correlation. However, Blackburn 
et. al. (2000) and Dalgaard and Kreiner (2003) demonstrate that it is possible to avoid 
scale effects and yet the determinants of long-run growth are the same as in Romer’s 
set-up. They combine R&D with human capital accumulation, and shows that scale 
effects depend exclusively on the existence of human capital externality effects, pro-
vided that there is no feedback of R&D on capital accumulation. By excluding exter-
nality effect it is possible to avoid scale effects and still obtain an endogenously de-
termined rate of long-run growth. In a related set-up with endogenous fertility, Han-
sen (1998) shows that there may exist a strong negative relationship between popula-
tion growth and per capita income, and a weakly negative relationship between popu-
lation growth and growth in per capita income in accordance with empirical evidence 
of developed countries. 
 
The unified growth theory aims at explaining not just the correlation between fertility 
and economic conditions in developed countries but to capture the process of devel-
opment over the course of human history from Malthusian stagnation to sustained 
economic growth. Unified growth theorists divide human history into tree sub-
periods: The Malthusian epoch, the post-Malthusian epoch and the modern growth 
regime. During the Malthusian Epoch, population growth and technological progress 
were insignificant by modern standards. Resources generated by technological pro-
gress and land expansion (leading to an increase in the level of income) were chan-
nelled primarily towards an increase in the size of the population, resulting in a negli-
gible average growth rate of per capita income. Further, the standards of living across 
countries did not appreciably differ because differences in technologies or in land pro-
ductivity across countries resulted in variations in population density rather than in 
the standard of living. 
 
During the post-Malthusian epoch, the technological progress increased markedly 
along the process of industrialization, triggering a take-off from Malthusian stagna-
tion. The positive Malthusian effect of per capita income on population growth was 
still maintained, meaning that the increase in income generated by the industrializa-
tion process led to a sizeable increase in population growth, which offset some of the 
potential gains in income per capita. Countries experienced the take-off from Malthu-
sian stagnation at different points because industrialization did not occur simultane-
ously across all countries. The developed regions experienced the take-off in the be-
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ginning of the 19th century, whereas the take-off in some of the less developed re-
gions was delayed well into the 20th century.  
 
The acceleration in the rate of technological progress in the second phase of the In-
dustrial Revolution led to increasing demand for human capital, reflecting the increas-
ing skill requirements in the process of industrialization. Parents started to give prior-
ity to child quality instead of child quantity which resulted in a reallocation of re-
sources towards education. The gradual increase in life expectancy and the wage dif-
ferential between parental labour and child labour also generated a further inducement 
for investment in human capital. As the fraction of individuals with high valuation of 
quality increased, technological progress intensified, thereby raising the rate of return 
to human capital. This interaction between the acceleration in technological progress 
and the human capital formation ultimately prompted the demographic transition.  
 
The theory suggests that prior to the demographic transition, population growth in-
creased along with investment in human capital, whereas the demographic transition 
brought about a decline in population growth along with a further increase in human 
capital formation. The transition to the modern growth regime which is a state of sus-
tained economic growth was therefore characterized by a gradual increase in the im-
portance of the accumulation of human capital relative to physical capital as well as a 
sharp decline in fertility rates. The rise in aggregate income has not been counterbal-
anced by population growth, enabling sustained technological progress and factor ac-
cumulation to bring about sustained growth in income per capita. The differential tim-
ing of the take-off from the post-Malthusian epoch and the corresponding variations 
in the timing of the demographic transition increased the gap between the richest re-
gions and the poorest regions, and therefore led to a great divergence in income per 
capita as well as population growth.  
 
Historical evidence suggests that the take-off from the post-Malthusian epoch to a 
state of sustained economic growth, rapid as it may appear, was a gradual process not 
plausibly viewed as the outcome of a major exogenous shock. The challenge to uni-
fied growth theorists is therefore to capture the observed gradual and continuous 
phase transition in a single dynamic system.  
 
Galor and Weil (2000) have developed a unified growth model that explains the evo-
lution of per capita income, technology and population over the course of human his-
tory with a dynamic system where the equilibria and their stability are altered qualita-
tively in the process of development. The model is an overlapping-generations-model 
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where each person lives in two periods – childhood and adulthood. During adulthood 
a person decides how much to consume, how many children to have, how much time 
to spend on work and how much time to spend on educating the children.  
 
The authors assume a minimum consumption level, and if the potential income at a 
certain time is sufficiently high so as to assure that the consumption is above this 
minimum level, then it will be optimal to spend time on educating children. On the 
other hand, if potential income is insufficient then an increase in parental potential in-
come raises the number of children but has no effect on their quality. Regardless of 
whether potential income is sufficiently high or not, increases in the wage rate does 
not change the division of child-rearing time between quality and quantity. However, 
the division is affected by the rate of technological progress because it changes the re-
turn to education: There is a positive relationship between technological progress and 
human capital for two reasons. First, technological progress increases the demand for 
an educated work force and therefore increases the expected return to investment in 
child quality. Second, skilled individuals have a comparative advantage in adapting 
new technologies which become more and more important as technology advances. 
Hence, technological progress reduces the quantity of children but increases their 
quality.  
 
The theory proposes that in early stages of development the economy is a stable Mal-
thusian equilibrium where the population size is relatively small. Technology ad-
vances rather slowly and generates proportional increases in output and population. 
Due to the fact that the rate of technological progress is slow, there is no incentive to 
invest in the quality of children. The inherent positive interaction between population 
and technology in this epoch, however, gradually increases the pace of technological 
progress. The economy is therefore situated in the only equilibrium in the dynamic 
system: the Malthusian equilibrium, g1, as depicted in figure 3. 
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Figure 3  
 
 
Source: Galor (2005), fig. 4.2, page 67 
 
An increase in the pace of technological progress has two opposing effects on the 
evolution of the population size. First, it eases households’ budget constraints, allow-
ing parents to allocate more resources to having children. Second, it induces a reallo-
cation of resources toward child quality. Due to the limited demand for human capi-
tal, the first effect dominates in this stage, and the rise in real income permits house-
holds to increase their family size. As population grows slowly in reaction to techno-
logical progress, the Malthusian equilibrium gradually shifts reflecting small incre-
ments in the rate of technological progress while the level of education remains at a 
zero level. When population has grown sufficiently it will generate a qualitative 
change in the dynamic system as depicted in figure 4. 
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Figure 4  
 
 
 Source: Galor (2005), fig. 4.3, page 67  
 
In the absence of large shocks, the economy remains in the vicinity of the Malthusian 
equilibrium where education is still zero but now the rate of technological progress is 
moderate. The population levels still rise and maintain continued increases in the rate 
of technological progress. As this continues, the dynamic system experiences another 
qualitative change resulting in the disappearance of the Malthusian equilibrium, see 
figure 5. 
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Figure 5  
 
 
 Source: Galor (2005), fig. 4.4, page 68 
 
The resulting equilibrium is the sustained growth regime characterized by high levels 
of education and technological progress. The intuition behind this is that the increase 
in the pace of the technological progress increases the demand for human capital and 
the additional resources from technological progress are reallocated towards child 
quality.  The interaction between investment in human capital and technological pro-
gress generates a virtuous circle: human capital formation prompts faster technologi-
cal progress, which in turn further raises the demand for human capital, inducing fur-
ther investment in child quality, triggering the demographic transition. The offsetting 
effect of population growth on the growth rate of per capita income is eliminated and 
the interaction between technological progress and human capital accumulation per-
mits the economy to converge towards the modern equilibrium characterized by sus-
tained economic growth. 
 
The emergence of human capital formation and its impact on the demographic transi-
tion and technological progress is a central element in the transition from the post-
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Malthusian regime to the state of sustained economic growth in all unified growth 
theories. The models differ, however, in explaining the mechanisms that generate or 
reinforce the rise in human capital formation. Some stress the importance of capital-
skill complementarity, i.e., that the accumulation of physical capital enhances the im-
portance of human capital in the production process (Fernandez-Vilaverde (2003) and 
Galor and Moav (2006)). Others stress the decline in mortality rates and the rise in 
life expectancy as explanation for the change in the division of child-rearing time 
from quantity to quality (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000)). Yet others fo-
cus on the adverse effect of the rise in the demand for human capital on child labour 
(Hazan and Berdugo (2002) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005)). Galor and Moav 
(2004) mention cultural or genetic evolution in the attitude of individuals towards 
human capital formation, while Galor and Mountford (2006) have the rise in demand 
for human capital via an increased specialization in the production of skill-intensive 
goods due to international trade. The potential connection between international trade 
and the emergence of human capital formation is surveyed closer in section 6.2. 
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5. Empirical evidence on international trade and growth 
A major problem in empirical analyses of trade and growth is the choice of measure-
ment for openness. The simple solution of choosing the value of trade relative to GDP 
yields ambiguous results. As an example, Ghana’s trade (imports + exports) com-
prised 93% of GDP in 2003 whereas South Korea’s only comprised 74% even though 
South Korea’s GDP per capita was 17971 $ against Ghana’s 2238 $; see World De-
velopment Indicators (2005). Thus, on the surface, in this case one could argue for an 
inverse relationship between trade and income. Furthermore, the causality is not ob-
vious since trade is affected by income and trade might have effects on income. This 
endogeneity problem implies econometric complications in establishing robust em-
pirical links between trade and income. Therefore, economists have applied a variety 
of other measures of openness related to an economy’s barriers for imports and/or ex-
ports aiming at achieving a more direct estimate of the restrictions facing potential 
trading partners. 
 
Some early noteworthy attempts to empirically analyse the link between trade protec-
tion and income/growth for developing countries was carried out by Krueger (1978), 
Bhagwati (1978) as referenced by Baldwin (2003). They used the effective exchange 
rates faced by importers/exporters taking into account a variety of macroeconomic 
policies. They find that trade barriers aiming at import substitution policies generally 
do not produce sustainable increases in long-run growth rates. The same conclusion is 
reached by Papageorgiou, Michaely and Choksi (1991) where they employ subjective 
indices of countries’ degrees of trade liberalisation. Balassa (1978) regresses the 
growth rate of exports on the growth rate of GDP. He finds a positive relationship be-
tween exports and growth. 
 
An often cited attempt at a measure of the level of protection was carried out by Dol-
lar (1992). He uses distortions in the real exchange rate where the hypothesis is that in 
the long run the law of one price holds.16  Therefore, the contention is that deviations 
from the law of one price can only be maintained if potential importers/exporters face 
barriers preventing them from taking advantage of the price differences. Thus, real 
exchange rate deviations are an aggregate estimate of the level of protections. Dollar 
(1992) finds a negative correlation between real exchange rate distortions and growth. 
However, the law of one price may fail to comply for a variety of other reasons as 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) states. In particular, monetary and nominal exchange 
                                                                      
16 The law of one price says that within a single market identical goods must sell at identical prices. 
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rate policies have a significant impact on the real exchange rate regardless of trade 
policies. Moreover, Rogriguez and Rodrik (2001) applies the Dollar procedure to the 
new updated version of the same data (Heston and Summers (1991)) and finds that 
the same regressions now yield the wrong sign. 
 
Another attempt to construct a reliable openness measure is done by Sachs and War-
ner (1995). By combining 5 different indicators a variable for openness is designed. 
The core statistic analysis of the paper is a multiple regression of growth as the de-
pendent variable on the openness variable and a number of other variables. Sachs & 
Warner include a handful of explanatory variables in order to partial out their cross-
country variations. Explanatory variables include policy variables, initial GDP, educa-
tional level, political unrest and investment rates. They find a robust and significant 
effect of the openness dummy on growth. The authors conclude that the openness in-
dicator has a significant positive relationship with growth between 1970 and 1989 ce-
teris paribus. Among other conclusions Sachs and Warner find indications of absolute 
convergence among open economies. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) scrutinize their 
findings and conclude that the openness measure is a result of several different mac-
roeconomic and trade policies. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) re-estimate their regres-
sions and find that the only two out of the five indicators account for the bulk of the 
variation in the data. The first of these measures indicate a state trading enterprise 
with monopoly over exports. This measure corresponds de facto to a Sub-Saharan Af-
rica dummy thereby making it indistinguishable from other factors specific to this re-
gion. Hence, it is doubtful whether this indicator can be said to measure trade barriers 
solely. The other significant indicator is a black market premium. However, this pre-
mium may arise from a host of other policies other than simply trade barriers. In con-
clusion, it is unlikely that the aggregate measure with five indicators provides a reli-
able estimate of openness per se. Furthermore, problems of selection bias and other 
econometric problems raise doubt over the findings. 
 
Several other empirical analyses of the link between trade and growth are reviewed 
by Rogriguez and Rodrik (2001) and are found not to be entirely convincing in dem-
onstrating a positive linkage. Hence, they conclude that the jury is still out on the 
question of whether openness is beneficial to growth. Instead, they argue for the im-
portance of considering the effects of various state variables thereby pointing towards 
contingent relationships rather than look for a general effect of trade on growth. Fur-
thermore, a more promising approach they suggest would be to consider more disag-
gregated relationships perhaps in the form of micro-econometrics whereby the indi-
vidual effects of trade on production and productivity can be identified. 
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Lee, Ricci and Rigobon (2004) consider the issue of endogeneity – also raised in Rod-
riguez and Rodrik (2001) – which they argue is a common problem in studies of trade 
and GDP. By construction the openness measure often implies endogeneity, thus, 
unless endogeneity is properly addressed in the econometric analyses the resulting es-
timates are biased and inference is invalid. Moreover, identifying the causal links may 
be impossible. In Lee, Ricci and Rigobon (2004) they apply an econometric method 
appropriate with endogeneity and generate robust, although small effects of openness 
to growth. However, they also find the equivalent reverse causality that growth effects 
openness. 
 
Another contribution to growth empirics without a foundation in formal modelling is 
Harrison (1995). She investigates the relationship between trade and growth by apply-
ing time series- and panel data analysis. A number of openness variables are used in 
regressions on the right hand side. She regresses growth on openness after controlling 
for the effect of variations in application of resources (physical and human capital as 
well as labour are accounted for). Although the correlation across different types of 
openness is not always strong, Harrison finds a generally positive association between 
growth and openness. 
 
Frankel and Romer (1999) employ an instrumental variable estimator in their analysis 
of growth and trade. They argue that simple OLS regressions of income on ex-
ports/imports are plagued by endogeneity problems. Thus, they apply geographical 
characteristics that are considered uncorrelated with trade policies as instruments. 
They find that generally there is a positive linkage and that OLS regressions do not 
overstate the effects, cf. Baldwin (2003). 
 
Dollar and Kray (2001) examine the with-in country differences in growth and trade. 
In this manner, they state, they avoid country specific differences and geographically 
related effects. They conclude that there is a strong and significant positive link be-
tween the changes in trade and changes in growth. 
 
The numerous attempts to establish a robust general link between trade and growth 
have not proven to be entirely convincing. Trade is in it self a composite of a variety 
of different products and services each of which could have different impacts on the 
growth mechanisms in an economy. Furthermore, the vast differences between coun-
tries’ economies in terms of factor endowments, education systems, geographical lo-
cation, degree of market oriented policies, abundance or lack of natural resources, etc. 
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provide for varying degrees and means of impact from trade. Edwards (1993) states 
that early cross-country statistical studies are based on overly simplistic theoretical 
models and are flawed for a number of econometric reasons. Similarly, Srinivasan 
and Bhagwati (2001) find that the weak theoretical foundations, the poor quality of 
data and inappropriate econometric techniques employed in many of these studies 
casts doubt over the validity of the findings. 
 
 Thus, the conclusion stated by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) that trade/growth analy-
ses need to be more targeted towards disaggregated mechanisms by which trade 
channels through the economy and effects growth seems warranted. 
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6. International trade and growth in theory  
The conventional trade theory determines the pattern of international trade and the 
distribution of welfare across countries in a static setting. It relates the pattern of trade 
to comparative advantage and predicts that if two countries engage in trade, each will 
have incentives to increase production of goods in which it has a comparative advan-
tage, i.e., the lower relative marginal cost prior to trade than the other country.17  The 
result is that each country exports goods in which it has a comparative advantage. 
Usually, comparative advantage is assumed to stem from either exogenous techno-
logical differences (as in the classical Ricardian model) or different factor endow-
ments (as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model).18  Hence, the conventional trade theory as-
sociates international trade with a reallocation of resources determined by exogenous 
differences across countries. 
 
The second goal of the conventional trade theory is to analyse the effects of interna-
tional trade in terms of welfare and the distribution of gains and losses. In short, in-
ternational trade increases aggregate national income through a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources. At the same time, it leaves at least some factors with reduced real 
income. For example, the Heckscher-Ohlin model has the abundant factor gaining 
from trade, while the scarce factor looses from trade. It is, however, possible to 
achieve Pareto gains from trade through lump sum taxes and transfers. Dixit and 
Norman (1980) demonstrate that in the absence of the lump sum possibility, it is pos-
sible to reach a situation where everyone gains from trade through a set of commodity 
and factor taxes and subsidies.  
 
The conventional trade theory is concerned with the level effects of international trade 
while disregarding growth effects. However, substantial changes to economies are 
achieved through the aggregate effects of growth over time. Hence, it seems impor-
tant to analyse the effects of international trade in a dynamic context. Unfortunately, 
the traditional neoclassical growth model precludes long-run growth effects of inter-
national trade. Opening up an economy where the ultimate source of growth is de-
scribed as exogenous technological progress has level effects and transitory growth 
effects: International trade in a two-good version of the neoclassical model has each 
country specializing relatively in producing the good in which it has a comparative 
advantage. This specialization pattern leads to a more efficient use of the world’s re-
sources. Hence, income and welfare improves in both countries but in the long run the 
                                                                      
17 See, e.g., Dixit and Norman (1980). 
18 See, e.g., Feenstra (2004). 
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growth rate is determined by the exogenously given rate at which technological 
breakthroughs occur.19 20     For this reason, analyses of dynamic effects of openness 
are scarce until the 1990’s - and because the neoclassical growth theory permits 
analyses of international linkages far simpler than observed patterns between, e.g., 
developed and developing countries. 
 
The development of the new growth theories that focus on R&D and product devel-
opment (cf. section 2.2) provides researchers with a tool that enables analyses of a 
wide range of international linkages in rich dynamic set-ups. Hence, the recent theo-
retical literature that links international trade and growth is able to concurrently ex-
plain, for example, the sources for comparative advantage, and to account for the evo-
lution of these differences over time, and explain effects on trade pattern. In this chap-
ter, we focus on international commodity trade and investigate, first, the determina-
tion of comparative advantage in a framework where the state of technology is 
endogenously determined, and comparative advantage is determined by the historical 
patterns of technological change (Section 6.1). Then we turn to a model of endoge-
nous population and consider the interaction between population growth and com-
parative advantage (Section 6.2).  
6.1. Endogenous comparative advantage 
Comparative advantage usually emerges from exogenous differences in technologies, 
factor endowments, or in other relevant differences across countries. But when coun-
tries engage in technological competition, comparative advantage becomes endoge-
nously determined. Research successes create export opportunities as innovators learn 
to produce goods that are better than, different from, or less costly than those manu-
                                                                      
19 The exact degree of specialization and the pattern of trade depend on the dissimilarity of the coun-
tries’ factor endowments prior to trade and the functioning of the international financial capital 
markets. 
20 This is not necessarily true in multisector versions of the neoclassical model as shown by Ventura 
(1997) and House (2000). By adding a second production sector to the model, House demonstra-
tes the possibility of periods of constant marginal returns to capital in a small open economy 
when production is diversified. The reason is that as capital accumulates, resources are continual-
ly reallocated from production of the relatively labour-intensive consumer good to the relatively 
capital-intensive investment good. As a result, factor prices remain constant as capital accumula-
tes, and the economy may experience a sustained period of constant marginal returns. This 
implies that level effects of trade liberalisation may be substantially larger than those normally in-
ferred from the neoclassical model. By replacing the standard neoclassical production functions 
with fixed-proportions technologies, Ventura demonstrates that trade liberalizations can lead to 
sustained growth in an economy, which has no growth in autarky. 
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factured abroad. How long-run trade patterns and growth rates are determined in the 
case of endogenous (or dynamic) comparative advantage depends on the geographical 
scope of knowledge spillovers. If international knowledge spillovers are costless and 
instantaneous globally, then the trade patterns are determined by relative factor en-
dowments as in the conventional trade theory. On the other hand, if research projects 
contribute to general knowledge only in the country where the research is carried out, 
then initial conditions can matter for the long-run pattern of trade. Reality undoubt-
edly lies between these extremes, and a plausible specification might include lags in 
the diffusion of knowledge that are shorter domestically than internationally and that 
decreases with the degree of openness. See section 7.1 for a further discussion of 
knowledge spillovers. 
 
In order to analyze dynamic effects of specialization in areas of comparative advan-
tage the model of product development described in section 2.2 is developed to in-
clude two consumer goods with different intensities in factor requirements. Often the 
two goods are described as a high technology good and a traditional (agricultural) 
good, where it is assumed that production of the traditional good is relatively more in-
tensive in unskilled labour and less intensive in human capital than the production of 
the high tech good. In this setting countries will be able to specialize in their respec-
tive sectors of comparative advantage. While the reallocation of resources from trade 
liberalization has positive income effects in a static setting, anticipated effects on the 
dynamic process, say on growth and income, are not so straightforwardly anticipated 
or clear. First, we analyse the case of international knowledge spillovers, then the case 
of national knowledge spillovers.   
 
International knowledge spillovers 
When international knowledge spillovers are instantaneous, all countries share in a 
common pool of knowledge capital. Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 7) ana-
lyse this case and find that comparative advantage, the pattern of specialization and 
the pattern of trade are uniquely determined by relative factor endowments. Factor 
prices likely equalize in cases when countries have similar factor endowments. In this 
case, the economy with a relative abundance of human capital undertakes relatively 
more research than the other economy and acquires the know-how to invent more 
blueprints. Hence, with the restriction that each intermediate good must be manufac-
tured in the country where it is developed, the human capital-abundant economy pro-
duces a relatively wider range of intermediate goods than the other country. This pat-
tern of specialization implies that firms in each country export the unique intermedi-
ate good that has been developed there. The pattern of inter-industry trade depends on 
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assumptions about international trade in financial assets. If there is no international 
trade in financial assets, then each country’s trade account must balance in each pe-
riod and the human-capital rich country imports the traditional consumer good and 
exports (on net) the high-tech good, while the unskilled labour-abundant country has 
the opposite pattern of trade. If, on the other hand, there is assumed to be international 
trade in financial assets, then a country may run a deficit on the trade account bal-
anced by a surplus on the income/service account in the long run. In this case, a coun-
try may become a net importer of both intermediate goods and the traditional con-
sumer good. 
 
Since knowledge spillovers are international, human capital devoted to research is 
equally productive in the two countries and, therefore, the countries face equal rates 
of product innovation. However, the pattern of specialization implies that real output 
grows faster in the human capital-abundant country than in the unskilled labour-
abundant country. This result follows from the facts that (i) high-tech manufacturing 
comprises a larger share of the national economy in the human capital-abundant coun-
try, and (ii) productivity growth of high tech manufacturing increases with product 
development while productivity of the traditional manufacturing sector is constant. 
Whether international trade is conducive to growth in the human capital-abundant 
country is, however, ambiguous. The reallocation of resources towards research tends 
to increase the rate of growth in the economy. However, since the world economy is 
relatively better endowed with unskilled labour than the human capital-abundant 
economy, the world economy will devote relatively more resources to unskilled la-
bour-intensive activities. Hence, the common rate of innovation may actually be less 
than in the human capital-abundant economy prior to trade. This tends to decrease the 
rate of growth of this economy such that the net effect of international trade on long-
run growth of the human capital-abundant economy is ambiguous. 
 
When the countries’ resource compositions adequately vary to preclude equalization 
of factor prices, at least one of the countries must find itself uncompetitive in the long 
run either in conducting R&D or in producing the traditional consumer good. Hence, 
the human capital-abundant country may specialize in R&D and high-tech manufac-
turing while the other country may specialize in traditional manufacturing implying 
faster GDP growth in the human capital-abundant country than in the other country. 
When factor prices are not identical across countries, it is interesting to relax the re-
striction that firms must manufacture intermediate goods in the same country as they 
have been invented. As explained in section 7.3.2, in this case, multinational corpora-
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tions may form, which may alter the long-run pattern of trade such that the human 
capital-abundant country exchanges blueprints for commodities.  
 
National knowledge spillovers 
When knowledge spillovers are confined to the national level, then the accumulated 
wisdom in a country can influence the cost of innovation there. Hence, prior experi-
ence may influence the allocation of resources to R&D and govern long-run out-
comes. In a framework where endogenously derived differences in general knowledge 
is the only basis for international trade, Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 8) 
show that initial stocks of general knowledge govern long-run outcomes. The country 
with a greater initial stock of general knowledge enjoys an initial advantage in the re-
search lab. Often, this country accumulates knowledge more quickly than other coun-
tries implying a more rapid increase in real wages, leading to a lower real interest 
rate. In turn this will stimulate higher investment and more rapid creation of ideas, 
leading to faster growth. The country will systematically increase its share, and the 
end result is that all R&D is done in the country with the initial advantage. This dy-
namic reduces growth in the country with the lower initial stock of general knowl-
edge.  
 
Young (1991) sets up a learning-by-doing model, where initial conditions govern the 
long-run outcome: A lack of technology diffusion gives the developed countries a 
comparative advantage in sectors with more potential of learning by doing. The least 
developed countries (LDCs) that begin with a lower level of general knowledge will 
specialize in production of relatively unsophisticated goods with less potential for 
learning by doing. As a result, the LDCs may experience a reduction in the rate of 
growth, which might translate into dynamic welfare losses from trade. In contrast, the 
developed countries enjoy faster growth and dynamic welfare gains. In the model, 
current comparative advantage is determined by the past history of technological 
change, while current patterns of comparative advantage play an important role in de-
termining the rate of future technological progress. This gives a potential rationale for 
policy intervention in order to promote local research activity or to induce the LDCs 
to specialize in goods with greater potential for learning by doing. Grossman and 
Helpman stress policy hysteresis - that a temporary subsidy to R&D activity can have 
permanent positive effect on the growth rate. 
 
 The Correlation between Openness and Long-Run Economic Growth, FOI 53
6.2. Comparative advantage and the development process 
In a unified growth model, Galor and Mountford (2006) focus on the interaction be-
tween population growth and comparative advantage. The description of the individu-
als of the economy is similar to the unified growth model surveyed in section 3.2: in-
dividuals live for two periods, and in the second period they decide how many chil-
dren to have, whether they shall be trained to be skilled or unskilled workers and how 
much time to spend on work. It takes more resources to train a child to be skilled 
worker than unskilled worker. There are two consumer goods in the economy - an ag-
ricultural good and a manufactured good. Production of either good may take place 
with either old or new technology. All technologies use unskilled labour but only the 
new technology for producing the manufactured good uses human capital. In the early 
stages of development, production is conducted using the old technologies. However, 
it is assumed that technological progress depends positively on population size and 
skill intensity, so that productivity of all technologies rises with population. More-
over, it is assumed that the new technologies advances more rapidly than the old ones 
so at some point in time, first, the new technology for producing agricultural goods 
become economically viable and, second, the new technology for producing manufac-
tured goods becomes profitable. When the agricultural sector starts to use the new 
technology, the economy escapes the Mathusian trap where wages fall as population 
increases. When the manufacturing sector begins using the new technology, there is a 
demand for skilled labour and parents start to substitute quantity of children for qual-
ity of children. In this stage, there is a self-reinforcing relationship between techno-
logical progress and the human capital intensity of the economy which causes both 
the rate of technological progress and the level of human capital to rise. 
 
International trade between countries at different technological stages may affect the 
timing of the demographic transition across countries, and may thereby explain the 
great divergence in income levels across countries in the last two centuries. The intui-
tion is as follows. The technologically advanced country has a comparative advantage 
in the production of the manufactured good since technological progress in the manu-
facturing sector is faster than in the agricultural sector. Hence, international trade in-
creases the demand for skilled labour in the advanced country and decreases it in the 
other country. Therefore, parents in the advanced country have fewer children but 
train more of them to be skilled workers, while parents in the other country have more 
children but less incentive to train them to be skilled workers. Hence, the demo-
graphic transition of the technologically advanced country is accelerated while the 
transition of the less advanced country is delayed as a result of international trade. 
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Also, the gains from trade are distributed unequally across countries since the less ad-
vanced country’s output growth is generated primarily by population growth such that 
output per capita is lower than in the advanced country (even in the case when trade 
affects output growth of the trading countries at the same rate). 
 
In conclusion, the dynamic effects of international trade are not as straightforward as 
the static effects. Grossman and Helpman demonstrate that the geographic scope of 
knowledge spillovers is crucial for the distribution of dynamic gains across countries: 
When knowledge spillovers are international, the country with the lower initial stock 
of general knowledge may experience lower growth as a result of international trade. 
When knowledge spillovers are national in scope, Young and Galor and Mountford 
also point to the danger that poor countries do not experience dynamic gains from 
trade due to uncompetitiveness in production lines with large growth potential. De-
spite these results, the positive static effects raise the level of welfare across countries. 
But in order for poor countries to reap the dynamic gains it may be necessary to sub-
sidise human capital accumulation or R&D. 
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7. International diffusion of knowledge and technology 
The industrial research laboratory produces two types of output: specific technical in-
formation that allows a firm to engage in a particular product or to engage in a par-
ticular production process, and general knowledge with wider applicability. Imports, 
education and information channels are some of the mechanisms with which knowl-
edge and technology shifts diffuse throughout countries. Consider the models of 
product development described in section 2.2, where the outcome of R&D depends 
positively on the amount of general knowledge generated by previous research activ-
ity. International diffusion of general knowledge takes place when the knowledge 
spillover is, to some extent, international in scope. Also, international technology dif-
fusion can be explained in terms of these models. Technology shifts take place when 
either new intermediate goods or intermediate goods of a better quality are being used 
in manufacturing. International technology diffusion ensures that intermediate goods 
from the technology frontier become available for use internationally.  
 
International trade is not necessarily a prerequisite for international knowledge or 
technology diffusion to take place. For example, international knowledge spillovers 
may happen through communication and cooperation at an informal level. However, 
international trade may facilitate the international diffusion of especially technology 
because follower countries get access to productive inputs from the technology fron-
tier or inputs with embodied technological progress. Comin and Hobijn (2004) distin-
guish between a push and a pull effect of international trade on technology diffusion. 
 
The push effect is the mechanism with which countries that import goods from more 
technological advanced countries get more exposed to new technological develop-
ments. These countries are likely to adopt the technologies that they are exposed to 
whereas countries that do not import goods from advanced economies are less likely 
to adopt new technologies. The pull effect works through the competition effect of in-
ternational trade: trade promotes competition which increases the incentives to inno-
vate and adopt new technologies by individual firms in order to sustain their interna-
tional competitiveness. 
 
The transfer of technology from developed countries to LDCs often happens through 
imitation efforts or establishment of multinational corporations.21  For imitation to be 
                                                                      
21 It is implicitly assumed that domestic technology diffusion is perfect. This assumption might be 
inappropriate, for example if a country’s population is scattered geographically in heterogeneous 
regions, and trade between these domestic regions is sparse. 
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profitable, a succesful imitator must be able to earn positive profits in competition 
with the inventor. This is often the case in an open world economy where imitation 
arises from cost differentials between developed countries and LDCs. Hence, some 
degree of specialization may happen such that R&D takes place in human-capital-rich 
countries while manufacturing primarily is done in countries with low manufacturing 
costs.22  There are, however, barriers to the international transfer of technology from 
developed countries to LDCs. One branch of the theoretical literature focuses on the 
existence of appropriate technologies. That is, a lack of complementary inputs and 
human capital that may prevent a country from obtaining productivity gains from 
technological innovations. 
 
International diffusion of knowledge and/or technology is perhaps the most important 
mechanism by which integration into the world economy can promote innovation and 
growth. Coe et al. (1997) show that foreign R&D appears to have beneficial effect on 
domestic productivity, and that this effect increases with the degree of openness. Na-
diri & Kim (1996) show that the relative importance of domestic R&D to foreign 
R&D varies across countries. Domestic R&D activity is highly important in the USA, 
while foreign R&D seems more important in countries like Italy and Canada. These 
empirical findings might be a result of either knowledge or technology diffusion since 
they cannot easily be separated from each other in practice. A few studies are more 
directly concerned with technology diffusion. Comin & Hobijn (2004) examine the 
diffusion of more than 20 technologies across 23 of the world’s leading industrial 
economies. Their results suggest a pattern of trickle-down diffusion. The rich techno-
logical leaders tend to be the ones that innovate and adopt new technologies the earli-
est. After adoption by the leading countries, the laggards follow suit and partially 
catch up with the leaders. Income per capita, human capital, openness, and strength of 
the judicial and legislature systems have a positive effect on the level of technology 
adoption. Comin & Hobijn’s results harmonize with a focus on appropriate technolo-
gies. The importance of the theory of appropriate technologies in describing technol-
ogy diffusion as an explanation for growth is also supported by Jerzmanovski (2002). 
He shows that the bulk of cross-country total factor productivity (TFP) differences are 
due to inefficient use or delayed adoption of new technologies by trailing countries. 
Some studies find imitation to be an important means of technology adoption. For ex-
ample, in a study of 48 product innovations Mansfield et al. (1981) found that 34 new 
products had been imitated during the sample period (between 5 and 20 years). 
                                                                      
22 If it is costly for firms to establish production facilities offshore then an innovator may consider 
patent licensing, that is, the innovator extends manufacturing rights to a producer in a foreign 
country in exchange for a royalty payment. 
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Even though the international transmission of general knowledge cannot easily be 
separated from diffusion of concrete technology know-how in practice, the dynamic 
effects of knowledge and technology diffusion are conceptually distinct. Therefore, in 
section 7.1 we focus on the dynamic effects of international knowledge diffusion, 
while international technology diffusion is described in section 7.2. In both sections, 
the effects are analyzed with the use of a model of growth through product develop-
ment where the countries are at the same developmental stage. Next, we turn to the 
transfer of technology from developed countries to LDCs: Section 7.3 presents poten-
tial growth effects of imitation and multinational corporations, while section 7.4 is 
concerned with the notion of appropriate technologies. Table 1 indicates which 
frameworks are surveyed. 
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Table 1 
Authors Main characteristics of the framework Surveyed in section 
  
Romer (1990) Horizontal product development, international 
knowledge spillovers 
7.1 
   
Howitt (2000) Vertical product development, international 
knowledge spillovers 
7.1 
   
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) R&D uses human capital and general knowl-
edge, technology diffusion through trade in in-
termediate goods 
7.2 
   
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) R&D uses the same technology as manufactur-
ing, technology diffusion through trade in inter-
mediate goods 
7.2 
   
Grossman and Helpman (1991, 
chap. 9.3) 
Countries with different amounts of  general 
knowledge, technology diffusion through trade 
in intermediate goods 
7.2 
   
Feenstra (1996) Countries with different sizes of the effective la-
bour force, technology diffusion through trade in 
intermediate goods 
7.2 
   
Grossman and Helpman (1991, 
chap. 11) 
Horizontal product development, imitation 7.3 
   
Grossman and Helpman (1991, 
chap. 12) 
Vertical product development, imitation 7.3 
   
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) The cost of imitation is an increasing function of 
the ratio between the number of intermediate 
goods invented in the North and the number of 
intermediate goods imitated in the South 
7.3 
   
Grossman and Helpman (1991, 
chap. 7.3) 
Countries with different endowments of human 
capital and labour, multinational corporations 
7.3 
   
Feenstra (1996) Countries with different initial amounts of gen-
eral knowledge, multinational corporations 
7.3 
   
Basu and Weil (1998) Countries with different savings rates, appropri-
ate technologies 
7.4 
   
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) Countries with different skill levels, appropriate 
technologies 
7.4 
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7.1. International knowledge spillovers 
Consider the framework of Romer (1990) and assume that there is no international 
trade in goods or factors. Instead, we analyse the effects of opening up for communi-
cation and cooperation at an informal level – an openness that give researchers access 
to the international pool of general knowledge.23 In this case, the total amount of gen-
eral knowledge increases and so does the production of designs in the research sector 
which promotes growth.24  Access to the international pool of general knowledge also 
gives rise to a reallocation of resources: The larger amount of general knowledge in-
creases the productivity of labour in the research sector while it has no effect on the 
productivity of labour in manufacturing (there is no international trade in intermediate 
goods). Therefore, labour is allocated away from manufacturing towards research ac-
tivity – a reallocation that also promotes growth. Hence, in this setting, the growth 
rate increases because the production of designs does and because labour is reallo-
cated towards research activity.  
 
In a model of rising product quality, Howitt (2000) shows that international knowl-
edge spillovers may give rise to conditional convergence. He assumes that as the gap 
between a country’s average productivity and the global leading-edge technology nar-
rows, innovations will raise average productivity by less and less. As a consequence, 
all countries’ growth rates will converge to the same value but their average produc-
tivity levels and income levels will not: Countries with a larger rate of innovation will 
also have permanently higher average productivity and a higher relative per capita in-
come. Howitt shows that both the productivity and the income level depend positively 
on the country’s investment rate, the productivity of its R&D, and the R&D subsidy 
rate and negatively on the world growth rate. 
 
In reality, the geographical scope of knowledge spillovers may depend on the degree 
of international trade that a country engages in: It might be the case that international 
trade in tangible commodities facilitates the exchange of intangible ideas. Caselli and 
Wilson (2004) find empirical evidence that capital imports from technological leaders 
may embody knowledge. Grossman & Helpman (1991b, chapter 6) use these consid-
erations to develop a functional form where the extent of the spillovers between two 
countries increases with the volume of their bilateral trade. Feenstra (1996) considers 
two alternative specifications. First, he supposes that general knowledge in a country 
                                                                      
23 This analysis is carried out in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). A similar analysis with the same 
result can be found in Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 9.1. 
24 The international pool of ideas increases only if there is not total overlap between the set of blue-
prints invented in each country. This is assumed to be the case. 
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reflects its own past innovation and an exogenous fraction of the innovation abroad. 
Second, he supposes that intermediate goods are traded and that a country learns from 
the foreign goods in proportion to their actual use. 
7.2. Technology diffusion between developed countries 
It is also possible to analyse the long-run effects of specific technological knowledge 
diffusion with the use of Romer’s (1990) framework. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) 
analyse effects of international trade in intermediate goods between two countries. 
The countries are similar in all respects except that trade induces researchers in the 
two countries to specialize in the production of different types of designs and avoid 
redundancy. The knowledge spillover may be either national or international in scope 
– the important assumption is that openness does not affect the geographical scope of 
it. In this setting, the authors demonstrate that international trade in intermediate 
goods has no long-run growth effects because trade raises the productivity of human 
capital in the manufacturing sector as well as in the research sector equally. The ex-
planation for this result is as follows. When researchers in the two countries specialize 
in the production of different types of designs the worldwide stock of designs will ul-
timately be twice as large as the stock that has been produced in either country under 
autarky. This doubles the marginal product of human capital in the manufacturing 
sector. For the research sector, opening of trade implies that the market for any newly 
designed good is twice as large as it was in the absence of trade. This doubles the 
price of the patents and the return to investing in human capital in research. Since the 
return to human capital doubles in both the competing sectors, trade does not affect 
the split of human capital between manufacturing and research. Hence, it does not 
change the long-run rate of growth of the countries. Even so there are positive level 
effects on output and welfare: The access to a wider range of intermediate goods in-
creases manufacturing output and, thereby, the level of welfare across countries.  
 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer demonstrate that the lack of correlation between technology 
diffusion and long-run growth is not a robust feature of the class of models that focus 
on product development. In an alternative version of the model where general knowl-
edge has no productive value and there are no externality effects, they find a positive 
correlation between trade in intermediate goods and long-run growth. Here, the re-
search technology is identical to the manufacturing technology implying that interme-
diates, human capital, and unskilled labour are used as inputs in research. In this 
model with an unchanged interest rate, trade in intermediate goods enlarges the mar-
ket which causes the same kind of increase in profit earned by the holder of a patent 
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as in the previous model. However, since the price of a patent is determined by tech-
nology, the only way that the larger market can be reconciled with a fixed price for 
the patent is through an increase in the interest rate. A higher interest rate reduces the 
demand for intermediates, thereby lowering the profit earned by the monopolist at 
each date. The higher interest rate leads to higher savings and faster growth in both 
countries. Hence, international trade in intermediate goods generates dynamic welfare 
gains in this set-up because the rate of growth is too low under autarky (compared 
with the rate that would be selected by a social planner). In conclusion, the analyses 
show that the growth effects of international trade are very sensitive to the specifica-
tion of the research technology: When research activity requires only general knowl-
edge and human capital, international trade in intermediate goods has no long-run 
growth effects while it causes a permanent increase in the rate of growth when R&D 
uses the same technology as manufacturing.  
 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Feenstra (1996) demonstrate that technology dif-
fusion may lead to uneven growth when the knowledge externality is national in 
scope and the countries differ in terms of either the amount of general knowledge that 
has been generated in the past (Grossman and Helpman) or the effective labour force 
(Feenstra). In both analyses product development is the ultimate source of growth, 
and it requires labour and general knowledge to invent designs for new intermediate 
goods. It is assumed that the knowledge externality is national in scope. There exist 
two types of final goods that are imperfect substitutes in consumption. When free 
trade in final goods exists, the analyses show temporary positive effects of trade in in-
termediate goods on the growth rate of product development in the larger country, but 
in the long run it approaches its autarky rate of growth. In the smaller country the 
long-run growth rate of product development is less than in autarky. Hence, the au-
thors demonstrate that trade can lead to uneven growth when the knowledge external-
ity is national in scope. In this case, the relatively larger amount of general knowledge 
generated in the past or greater effective labour force allows the larger country to in-
troduce new products at a faster rate such that it captures a growing share of the total 
number of differentiated intermediate goods and a growing share of world aggregate 
demand. This puts an upward pressure on wages in the larger country which offers the 
prospect of capital gains, giving entrepreneurs a greater incentive to introduce new in-
termediate goods. The opposite happens in the smaller country such that product de-
velopment takes place at different long-run rates in the two countries. Feenstra notes 
that if the countries are of identical size, there would be no growth effects of trade in 
intermediate goods – as in the first model of Rivera-Batiz and Romer. Likewise, it is 
conjectured that the countries will grow at different long-run rates when the knowl-
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edge externality is national and the countries differ in terms of either the amount of 
general knowledge generated in the past or the amount of human capital in Rivera 
Batiz and Romer’s first model. This may explain why developing countries with low 
amounts of human capital experience lower growth rates than rich countries even 
when there are no barriers to the international diffusion of technology. This issue is 
further explored in section 7.4. 
 
The lower growth rate of product development in the smaller country in Grossman 
and Helpman’s and Feenstra’s analyses does not necessarily mean that the smaller 
country experiences welfare losses due to trade. Since the growth rate of product de-
velopment in the larger country is temporarily higher with trade than in autarky, the 
price of the final good produced in this country is lower under free trade than in au-
tarky. Even though the price of the final good produced in the smaller country is 
higher under free trade than in autarky, the price index of the smaller country de-
creases as a result of trade in intermediate goods provided that the initial market share 
of the smaller country is not too high. This reduction in the price index leads to utility 
gains in the smaller country even though its growth rate of product development de-
creases as a result of international trade in intermediate goods.  
 
In conclusion, the theoretical literature points to the existence of positive static or dy-
namic welfare gains from international technology diffusion between countries at the 
same developmental stage. However, when it comes to the question of a correlation 
between international technology diffusion and long-run growth, the answer seems to 
be “it depends”. When research activity does not use the specific technology that dif-
fuses across countries as a result of international trade, then trade liberalisation does 
not affect countries’ long-run growth performances unless the countries are of differ-
ent sizes in terms of the effective labour force or the amount of general knowledge 
that has been generated in the past – in which cases the smaller country may experi-
ence lower long-run growth as a result of international trade in intermediate goods. 
However, when the technology that diffuses is used in research activity then trade lib-
eralisation promotes long-run growth across countries.  
7.3. Imitation 
Leaving aside trade between similar countries or trade between countries that only 
differ in terms of relative endowments and looking at technology diffusion between 
developed countries and LDCs, it is more likely to take place through imitation than 
through mutual adaption of technologies invented abroad. In this case, trade in inter-
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mediate products combined with weak international patent laws make it possible for 
firms in LDCs to imitate a product that was initially invented in a developed country 
and capture market-share and quasi-rents by under-pricing the original innovator. 
Grossman and Helpman’s (1991, chapters 11 and 12 analyse the long-run effects of 
imitation in models of vertical and horizontal product development, respectively. It 
turns out that the two models may yield different predictions about the relationships 
between imitation and the long-run rate of growth. 
 
First, we consider the effects of imitation in a simple model of horizontal product de-
velopment. There exist two countries or regions: an innovating North and an imitating 
South. Innovation in the North takes place with the use of labour and general knowl-
edge. It is assumed that the South does not innovate at all – here imitation is the vehi-
cle for technological progress. An entrepreneur in the South can gain the ability to 
produce an existing variety invented in the North by devoting labour to the task of 
imitation. Moreover, there is assumed to be a knowledge externality in imitation like 
the knowledge externality that exists in research. Grossman and Helpman assume that 
it is proportional to the number of technologies that the South has already acquired. 
When international trade in intermediate goods is allowed, there are two contradicting 
effects of imitation on the long-run rate of growth in the North. On the negative side, 
the exposure to imitation shortens the expected duration of monopoly rents which 
tends to reduce growth. On the positive side, Northern producers enjoy higher rates of 
profits during their tenure as monopolists. This is because each surviving Northern 
firm benefits when a Southern producer takes over manufacturing from a rival North-
ern brand, as it is then able to hire some of the laid-off workers and thereby expand its 
sales and profits. This effect tends to increase the growth rate of the North. It turns out 
that the positive effect outweighs the negative effect in equilibrium, such that imita-
tion is conducive to growth in the North. Obviously, imitation also increases growth 
in the South since it has little or no capacity to invent new products on its own. But 
even if the South could develop new varieties from scratch, it is more likely to grow 
faster when imitation is possible since more labour is needed to invent a new good 
than to copy an existing one. 
 
When horizontal product development takes place, innovators in the North look ahead 
to their ultimate displacement from the market by imitators in the South. When verti-
cal product development takes place, Southern imitators too must foresee their own 
eventual demise in the wake of further technological advances in the North. It turns 
out that if the South is relatively efficient at innovation, though still less so than the 
North, then both the North and the South undertake R&D. Hence, the history of any 
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product line may be complex because at any moment the position of leadership in the 
market may pass from one Northern firm to another or from North to South. In this 
case it is not possible to determine whether the positive or the negative effect of imi-
tation on Northern growth dominates. The net effect of imitation on Northern growth 
is ambiguous. 
 
While Grossman and Helpman considers only long-run effects, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1997) analyse both transitory and permanent growth effects of imitation in a 
version of Romer’s (1990) model of expanding product variety. In a two-country set-
ting they assume that to begin with, the number of intermediate goods available in the 
North exceeds the number available in the South, and that all of the varieties of goods 
known in the South are also known in the North. They assume no international trade 
in intermediate goods. Hence, agents in the North have no incentive to imitate since 
there does not exist a pool of foreign goods to copy. On the other hand, agents in the 
South imitate since the cost of imitation is assumed to be lower than the cost of inno-
vating. Fig. 6 illustrates the cost of imitation function where N1 is the number of types 
of intermediates available in the North, and N2 is the number of intermediates avail-
able in the South, N2≤N1, 2η  is the innovation cost in the South, and 2ν  the cost of 
imitation in the South. It is seen that the cost of imitation is assumed to be an increas-
ing function of the ratio between the number of intermediate goods invented in the 
North and the number of intermediate goods imitated in the South. 
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Figure 6: The Cost of Imitation in the South  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), fig. 1, page 6 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin show that if the South is intrinsically inferior to the North in 
terms of a combination of productivity parameters, labour endowments and cost of 
innovation, then the South never has an incentive to conduct R&D and the North 
never has an incentive to imitate. In this case, the North is the perpetual leader and the 
South is the perpetual follower. On the other hand, if the South has been inferior to 
the North for a long time, but an improvement in government policy renders the 
South intrinsically inferior, then, when all of the North’s discoveries have been cop-
ied, Southern firms find it advantageous to start innovating. Then the inventions in the 
South create a pool of products that will be imitated in the North, and since the cost of 
imitation is lower than the cost of invention, agents in the North now find imitation 
preferable to invention. The North’s role thereby shifts from leader to follower. 
 
In the analysis by both Grossman and Helpman and by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, the 
imitating and the innovating region converge towards the same long-run rate of 
growth of product development. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s interpreta-
tion “the rate of discoveries plays the role in this model that the exogenous rate of 
technical change plays in the neoclassical model”.25  Contrary to the findings by 
                                                                      
25 Page 2. 
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Grossman and Helpman, imitation does not affect the growth rate of the North in the 
analysis by Barro and Sala-i-Martin. This is because there is assumed to be no inter-
national trade in intermediate goods such that imitation does not affect the expected 
duration of monopoly rents and the possibility of hiring laid-off workers from rival 
Northern production that has been taken over by the South. 
 
Models of product development that incorporate technology diffusion tend to give 
rise to patterns of conditional convergence in income per capita. In the analysis by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, the relatively low cost of imitation implies that the South 
grows faster than the North and tends to catch up with this region (for given govern-
ment policies and other variables that affect the return from the introduction of new 
technologies). However, as the pool of copiable material decreases, the cost of imita-
tion rises and the growth rate of the South falls. Thus the increase in the cost of imita-
tion represents a form of diminishing returns (in this case to imitation) that is analo-
gous to the diminishing returns to capital accumulation in the neoclassical model. In 
this sense, models of product development are consistent with the notion of condi-
tional convergence but convergence takes place not through diminishing returns to 
capital but through technology transfer. 
 
Multinational corporations 
When international trade is liberalised, imitation may promote an international split 
between R&D activity and manufacturing activity. Establishment of multinational 
corporations is another channel through which this split may happen. Cost and skill 
differentials between developed countries and LDCs may induce profit-maximizing 
firms to establish multinational corporations as analysed by Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), chapter 7.3. The model consists of two countries, a human capital-abundant 
and a labour-abundant country, and two consumer goods, a traditional good that is 
produced with human capital and labour, and a high technology good that is manufac-
tured from differentiated intermediate inputs. A necessary condition for establishment 
of international corporations to be interesting is that when firms must manufacture 
their innovative products in the same country where their research facilities are lo-
cated, factor price equalization between the two countries does not happen. In this 
case, when the trade equilibrium is characterised by higher costs of manufacturing in-
novative products in the human capital rich country then innovators in the human 
capital rich country have an incentive to move their production activities offshore. It 
is demonstrated that there exists many trade equilibria with multinational corporations 
characterised by factor price equalization. This equalization emerges as a result of the 
separation of research and manufacturing activities by at least some entrepreneurs that 
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abate the pressures of labour demand that otherwise cause the wage rate in the human 
capital rich country to exceed that in the labour-rich country. In these equilibria, the 
human capital rich country may import the traditional good and a greater volume of 
innovative goods than it exports. 
 
In a related set-up with national knowledge spillovers and free trade, Feenstra (1996) 
demonstrates that multinational production will stop R&D activity in the country with 
the lowest initial amount of general knowledge since firms operating here have higher 
fixed costs  but earn the same profits from sale of intermediate goods as firms located 
in the other country. Feenstra shows that despite the fact the R&D stops in one coun-
try, the growth rate of final output in both countries may be higher, and the rate of de-
cline in consumer prices greater due to the multinational activity. This suggests long-
run welfare gains for both countries. 
7.4. Appropriate technologies 
One branch of the endogenous growth literature emphasizes the lack of appropriate 
technologies as an important source for cross-country differences in total factor pro-
ductivity. The idea is that countries need a sufficient amount of complementary inputs 
to gain productivity from technological advances. Hence, LDCs may refrain from us-
ing a new technology designed to make optimal use of the prevailing factors and con-
ditions in richer countries because the technology is inappropriate for LDCs. There 
are many dimensions in which technological needs of LDCs differ from those of de-
veloped countries, including climate, geography, culture and skill levels. For what-
ever reason, the result is that technologies designed for optimal productivity in devel-
oped countries may incite little or no productivity growth in LDCs, even though there 
are no barriers to the technology diffusion. This may account for the LDC technology 
frontier capital (e.g. computing and accounting machinery, electrical and communica-
tion equipment) being less than that of richer countries (Caselli & Wilson (2004)).  
 
Basu and Weil (1998) assume that each technology is appropriate for one unique 
capital-labour ratio, and that technological change takes the form of learning-by-
doing: Firms learn over time to improve the productivity of the specific capital-labour 
mix that they are using and of similar techniques. This means that when a country is 
producing at some level of capital per worker, the level of technology appropriate for 
capital-labour ratios within a neighbourhood of that country’s current capital-labour 
ratio increases. Hence, a country uniformly improves technologies within a given 
range of the technology it is currently using. Basu and Weil use a simple AK-
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production function (see section 2.1) and assume that technology is freely mobile 
across countries. However, technology transfer is not immediate because technologies 
are indexed by capital intensity: Time is needed for countries to achieve a develop-
ment level that can fully utilize technologies developed by the technology leaders. 
The model assumes a maximum level of learning-by-doing bounded to any given 
capital-labour ratio, and that this maximum level increases with the capital-labour ra-
tio. This implies that technologies have increasingly high potential at higher levels of 
development.  
 
In the model’s two-country version, where the savings rate of the countries differ, 
Basu and Weil find two possible equilibria – one where the two countries experience 
different growth rates, and one where the income levels differ but the countries share 
a common growth rate. Which equilibrium is observed depends on the parameters of 
the model, and not on initial conditions. If the countries grow at similar rates, the 
country with the highest savings rate must have a lower level of technology at each 
capital-labour ratio. This happens only when the high-saving country is always in the 
lead. As a result, this leaves an improved level of technology for the other country to 
use, thereby allowing it to grow at the same rate despite its lower savings rate. This 
equilibrium will be observed if the two countries’ capital-labour ratios are not too dis-
similar. In this case, the learning-by-doing experienced in one country contributes to 
the level of technology being used in the other country. When the distance in the 
countries’ capital-labour ratio is sufficiently large for the leader not to profit of the 
learning-by-doing experienced in the follower country, the two countries will have 
different growth rates in the long run.  
 
There exists a possibility of convergence clubs among various countries because of 
spillovers. In a multi-country setting, countries with small differences in their savings 
rate tend towards a common growth rate, whereas the opposite occurs with countries 
with substantially variant savings rates within each club, countries share the same 
growth rate but have different levels of income.  
 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) focus on differences in skill levels as the main reason 
why LDCs’ technological needs differ from those of developed countries. All the re-
sults in this model originate from the fact that the relative abundance of skills in the 
North induces “skill-biased” innovations. 
 
They consider a world economy consisting of a large advanced Northern country, and 
a set of small less developed Southern countries. To simplify the analysis, all South-
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ern countries are assumed to be identical. The North and South are distinguished by 
relative size and relative endowments of skills. The North employs skilled workers in 
tasks performed by unskilled workers in the South. A number of final goods can be 
produced with two alternative technologies. The first uses unskilled labour and a set 
of differentiated intermediate goods, whereas the second technology uses skilled la-
bour and a different set of intermediate goods. The key assumption is that some in-
termediate goods (machines) can only be used by unskilled workers, while some other 
intermediate goods (computers) can only be used by skilled workers. When LDCs are 
forced to use unskilled workers, they will use the “machinery” technology rather than 
the computer technology and be less productive as a result.  
 
The authors show that in equilibrium, only the North innovates while Southern pro-
ducers copy the technologies developed in the North. In the absence of international 
trade, intermediate producers located in one country cannot sell their products to 
firms located in the other countries, so the relevant market for technologies is the lo-
cal market. Because the South consists of a set of small economies, intermediate firms 
will have an infinitesimal market, and the South will not invest in R&D. Hence, R&D 
firms target their innovations towards the needs of the North, and Southern producers 
copy technologies from the North. 
 
In equilibrium, all Northern sectors have the same TFP, while Southern sectors that 
use skilled technologies have higher TFP than Southern sectors using unskilled tech-
nologies. Moreover, the TFP will be larger in the North in sectors that use unskilled 
technologies in the South, and will be larger in the South in sectors that use skilled 
technologies in the South. The intuition for this result is that the South has access to 
the same set of technologies and are relatively scarce in skilled workers, so their price 
and value of production in the skill-intensive sectors will be relatively high. 
 
When R&D firms direct their research towards the needs of the North, both output per 
worker and output per efficiency unit of labour are higher in the North than in the 
South.  The reason for this difference is a technology-skill mismatch. A larger supply 
of skills in the North implies that new technologies are relatively skill-
complementary, whereas the South, which employs unskilled workers in most tasks 
and sectors, needs more labour-complementary technologies. Furthermore, both pro-
ductivity and output per worker in the North relative to the South are strictly increas-
ing in the relative productivities of skilled and unskilled workers. Therefore, as tech-
nologies become more skill-biased, the output gap between the North and the South 
widens. It is important to note that if R&D firms could sell to Southern producers, 
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they would invest more resources in unskilled technologies. This would result in a 
smaller productivity-gap between the North and the South.   
 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti generalize their model to include international trade in final 
goods and this causes further divergence in output per worker. Since no international 
trade in intermediate goods is assumed, inventors continue to sell intermediate goods 
to only Northern  producers, so the relevant market size for inventors do not change. 
But trade causes the relative price of skill-intensive goods to increase, making skill-
complementary innovations more profitable, i.e. technologies are now more skill-
biased. This reduces the productivity of unskilled workers both in the South and the 
North, and because the South is more abundant in unskilled workers, its relative in-
come compared to the North deteriorates. Trade therefore amplifies income differ-
ences between the North and the South. Despite causing divergence in output per 
worker, trade leads to convergence in output per efficiency unit of labour and in  TFP. 
The reason for TFP equalization is factor price equalization. TFP is low in the South 
when unskilled workers perform tasks that skilled labour could do better. Commodity 
trade, however, ensures factor price equalization and induces firms in the South to 
employ unskilled workers only in the tasks performed by unskilled workers in the 
South, and likewise for skilled workers i.e. TFP differences disappear. 
 
 
 
72 The Correlation between Openness and Long-Run Economic Growth, FOI 
8. Conclusions and discussion 
This final chapter concludes the literature survey by briefly summarizing the main 
findings regarding the core issues mentioned in the introduction. 
 
Mechanisms that may give rise to a correlation between openness and growth 
The neoclassical growth theory associated with Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) focus 
on physical capital accumulation and exogenous technological progress, and predicts 
that countries’ economic growth rate is exogenous in the long run. Contrary to this, 
the growth theory developed in the late 1980’s and 1990’s focus on human capital ac-
cumulation, and research and development of new or better technologies, and deter-
mines countries’ growth rate endogenously (e.g., Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), 
Aghion and Howitt (1992)). This theory incorporates real-life market imperfections, 
e.g., externality effects and monopolistic competition. Since the long-run rate of 
growth is endogenously determined in these frameworks, various types of openness – 
international trade, international knowledge spillovers, international technology diffu-
sion, imitation, foreign direct investment – may affect countries’ rates of growth in 
the long run.  
 
While a framework focussing on one single source of growth may provide an ade-
quate description of an economy at a given developmental stage, it is hardly an ap-
propriate description of the development of an economy from stagnation to self-
sustained growth, or of countries at different developmental stages. Therefore, the 
stage theories combine different growth mechanisms that vary in importance at dif-
ferent stages of development (e.g., Baldwin et al (2001), Funke and Strulik (2000), 
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002), Acemoglu et al (2006)). The unified growth the-
ory goes a step further and explains the development of the population size along with 
the economic and technological development (Galor and Weil (2000)). 
 
Conditions under which openness (does not) promotes growth 
The theoretical literature analyses a variety of international linkages and find mixed 
results regarding the correlation between openness and growth. Taking a broad over-
view, the majority of the literature suggests that openness is either conducive to 
growth or has no effect on countries’ long-run rate of growth. First of all, opening up 
for communication and cooperation at an informal level may facilitate the interna-
tional diffusion of general knowledge which promotes growth across countries be-
cause the production of new ideas increases and because more labour is allocated to-
wards research activity (Romer (1990)). Second, international commodity trade may 
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promote growth across countries because it induces a more efficient allocation of re-
sources between manufacturing and research. Hence, the country with a comparative 
advantage in R&D specializes relatively in research activity while the other country 
specializes relatively in manufacturing. As a result the growth rate of the world econ-
omy increases compared to autarky (Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 7). 
 
However, the dynamic gains from trade may be unequally distributed across countries 
and in some cases countries may actually lose. Countries can differ in terms of human 
capital abundance (Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 7), initial stock of general 
knowledge (Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 8, Young (1991), Feenstra 
(1996)) and technological stage (Galor and Mountford (2006), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1997)). The majority of the analyses predict that the rich country experiences 
higher growth as a result of international trade. The reason is that the rich country has 
an initial comparative advantage in producing the good with the largest growth poten-
tial, and this initial advantage gives rise to a dynamic process that extend the advan-
tage over time. 
 
Even though the theoretical contributions incorporating trade into economic models 
have progressed steadily, the empirical analyses have not been equally numerous. 
One major problem is lack of sufficient and reliable data for many countries. Specifi-
cally, for developing countries - the countries for which the question of the link be-
tween trade and income probably has the greatest importance - data are scarce. An-
other problem stems from the fact that trade can effect an economy in many ways. 
Thus, simple measures of a country’s barriers to trade may not be able to capture the 
full extent of the impacts - country specifics play a major role. In conclusion, the lit-
erature of empirical studies of the links between openness and growth call for targeted 
and rigorous econometric analyses that employ appropriate theoretical specifications.   
 
Specific conditions/problems to take account of when considering developing 
countries 
For poor countries there seems to be more uncertainty about the dynamic effects of 
opening up for international trade: Along with the rich countries extending their com-
parative advantages in producing goods with large growth potential, the poor coun-
tries may find themselves specializing in production activities with low growth poten-
tials (Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 8, Young (1991), Galor and Mountford 
(2006)). 
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The main potential source of dynamic gains from openness to poor countries seems to 
be international technology diffusion taking the form of either imitation or multina-
tional corporations. Lower costs of production enable producers in developing coun-
tries to capture market shares and quasi-rents by under-pricing the original innovator 
(Grossman and Helpman (1991), chapter 11, 12, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), 
Feenstra (1996)). However, when it comes to international technology diffusion, there 
is also a danger of poor countries not reaping the dynamic gains: If use of technolo-
gies developed in rich countries requires the existence of complementary inputs 
which are not present in developing countries, this may refrain these from using the 
new technology and gain productivity growth (Basu and Weil (1998) and Acemoglu 
and Zilibotti (2001)). Hence, it may be necessary to develop certain structural charac-
teristics of developing economies in order to reap the dynamic benefits of openness. 
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